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ABSTRACT 
 
Lawley, Chad D., M.Sc.  University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Spring 2004.  
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations in the U.S. Intensive Livestock 
Industry
Supervisor: W.H. Furtan. 
 
 When setting the stringency of environmental regulations of the intensive 
livestock industry, governments make a trade-off between rural economic development 
and environmental quality.  This trade-off represents the weight the government places 
on social welfare relative to the profitability of the intensive livestock industry.  The 
impact of the weight the government places on rural economic development on the 
formation of environmental regulations in the US intensive livestock industry is 
examined in this thesis. 
 A political economy model explaining the formation of environmental regulations 
in the presence of a special interest lobby group is developed.  The theoretical model 
finds that the incumbent government sets policy in response to the marginal disutility 
from pollution, the intensity of pollution damages, and according to the weight the 
government places on rural economic development. 
 The theoretical model is tested using a cross-sectional analysis of 1997 intensive 
livestock industry environmental regulations across US states.  Econometric results 
provide evidence that state governments implement more stringent regulations in 
response to the concerns of rural citizens and the intensity of pollution damages.  The 
study finds that the pressure to pursue rural economic development has a positive 
relationship with the stringency of regulations.      
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The threat of a “race to the bottom” in environmental standards among US states 
was among a number of factors that led the federal government to create the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1968 and “to pass subsequent legislation 
establishing national standards for air and water quality” (List and Gerking, 2000).  Oates 
and Schwab (1988) describe two opposing views of the consequences of economic 
competition between jurisdictions.  The “distortion inducing” view maintains that the 
local determination of standards for environmental quality will be subject to interregional 
competition, resulting in relaxed standards for environmental quality; essentially 
supporting the “race to the bottom” hypothesis.  Conversely, the “efficiency enhancing” 
view proposes that regional competition provides regions with the opportunity to choose 
the type and scale of environmental quality they desire.   
If the “race to the bottom” hypothesis is indeed true, this indicates that 
maintaining or improving environmental quality has perceived costs in terms of reduced 
economic growth; otherwise regions would not compete on the basis of environmental 
standards.  The “race to the bottom” implies that political decision makers place priority 
on economic growth rather than on maintaining environmental quality (Harrison, 1996).  
Following the economic efficiency-enhancing proposal, regional decisions reflect 
regional preferences for maintaining environmental quality versus stimulating economic 
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growth.  “If existing residents care about public outputs (including environmental 
quality), and presumably they do, then tax or standard competition to attract economic 
activity imposes real costs on the citizenry” (Oates and Schwab, 1988, p. 388).  Thus, 
regional differences in environmental standards result from differences in the perceived 
political tradeoffs between economic growth and environmental quality.  Regardless of 
the view of the effects of economic competition between regions, both theories maintain 
that decisions regarding the provision of environmental quality are political in nature. 
Based on the inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and 
income levels proposed by Kuznets (1955), the environmental economics literature has 
examined a similar relationship between income and pollution (referred to as the 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)), where pollution increases with income at low 
levels of income and pollution decreases with income at high levels of income (Grossman 
and Krueger (1992) and Seldon and Song (1994)).  Shafik (1994) maintains that it is 
difficult to make unambiguous theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between 
environmental quality and per capita income.  Empirically, Shafik finds that the 
relationship between income and pollution is negative when environmental degradation is 
localized.  On the other hand, if the environmental damage is a global problem, then 
environmental deterioration tends to increase as income increases.1     
Grossman and Krueger (1995) suggest that the link between income and 
environmental quality is primarily due to an induced policy response: “As nations or 
regions experience greater prosperity, their citizens demand that more attention be paid to 
                                                 
1 Local air pollution, for example, is found to have a U-shaped relationship with income.  At low levels of income, due 
to the process of industrialization, local air pollution increases with increased income.  Beyond a threshold level of 
income, as the economy develops and new technologies are adopted, higher incomes tend to reduce local air pollution.  
Carbon emissions, on the other hand, are a global problem and the relationship between carbon emissions and per 
capita income is positive (Shafik, 1994).   
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the noneconomic aspects of their living conditions” (p. 372).  The EKC has been 
interpreted as a long-run relationship implying that improvements in environmental 
quality are driven by increased income (Beckerman, 1992).  Nonetheless, in the context 
of the political economy of environmental regulations, the overall level of income may 
not be the relevant measure of the political pressure for environmental quality relative to 
economic development.  Political decisions are largely driven by the short-term pressures 
of the political cycle.  Therefore, the recent performance of the economy may better 
reflect the incentive incumbent governments have to implement environmental 
regulations.  This thesis examines the impact of the perceived short-run political tradeoff 
between environmental quality and economic development on the formation of 
environmental policy in the US intensive livestock sector.       
 
1.1 Background 
In early 2003, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implemented new 
federal environmental regulations applying to confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs). 2  These regulations were implemented in response to the changing nature of 
the US intensive livestock sector and to apparent enforcement and compliance problems 
with the existing regulations.  The EPA’s rationale for the development and 
implementation of these revised regulations was as follows: 
The continued trend toward fewer but larger operations, coupled with 
greater emphasis on more intensive production methods and 
specialization, is concentrating more manure nutrients and other animal 
waste constituents within some geographic areas.  These large operations 
often do not have sufficient land to effectively use the manure as fertilizer.  
                                                 
2 Confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) is the EPA term equivalent to intensive livestock operation (ILO).  These 
two terms and their associated acronyms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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Furthermore, there is limited land acreage near the CAFO to effectively 
use the manure.  This trend has coincided with increased reports of large-
scale discharges from CAFOs, as well as continued runoff that is 
contributing to the significant increase in nutrients and resulting 
impairment of many US water bodies. (EPA, 2003, p. 7180). 
 
Prior to 2003, existing federal policies regulating the US intensive livestock sector 
had not achieved the uniform environmental results for which they were designed.  The 
revised regulatory rules were developed in order to assure that “strong and consistent 
national expectations” existed for the intensive livestock industry (EPA, 2003, p. 7182).   
Since responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of US intensive 
livestock environmental regulations rested with state governments, non-uniform 
environmental results indicated that state governments were potentially competing on the 
basis of environmental standards.  Prior to 2003, implementation of the EPA’s base 
regulations coincided with the imposition of increasingly more stringent state-level 
environmental regulations (Metcalfe, 2001).  Despite the increasing stringency of state-
level intensive livestock environmental regulations, differences in both the regulatory 
stringency and the pollution damages from intensive livestock production among states 
persisted.  The following sections discuss the issues relevant to the regulation of the US 
intensive livestock industry as they stood in and around the year 1997. 
 
1.1.1 Pollution Problems 
Intensive livestock production results in both a point and non-point source of 
water pollution.  Point source pollution is delivered to surface and/or ground water 
directly from a single or identifiable small number of sources, whereas non-point source 
pollution enters the water source diffusely from a large number of sources.  Point and 
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non-point source manure nutrient pollution result from “surface runoff and erosion, 
overflows from lagoons, spills and other dry-weather discharges, leaching into soil and 
ground water, and volatilization of compounds and subsequent redeposition on the 
landscape” (EPA, 2003, p. 7181).  The pollutants contained in animal manure include 
nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus are the primary concern), organic matter, pathogens, 
and odorous compounds (EPA, 2003).  Manure nitrogen enters water systems through 
runoff and leaching while manure phosphorus is transported to water systems primarily 
by soil erosion.   
Agricultural practices in the US are generally recognized as the largest source of 
non-point pollution of water bodies (Ribaudo, et al., 1999).  In 1998 the EPA reported 
that agriculture is the largest source of water pollution in rivers and streams in the US.  
Based on 50 1996 State 305(b) Reports, the EPA estimated that agricultural activity 
“degrades aquatic life or interferes with public use” of 25% of the river miles surveyed in 
the reports.3  Of all water quality problems identified in the rivers and streams surveyed, 
70% were contributed to by agriculture.  Cook and Stanley (1998) note that animal 
operations are identified as impacting 20% of impaired river miles in the 22 states 
providing information about specific types of agriculture in the 1996 State 305(b) 
Reports.  In addition to water quality problems in rivers and streams, agriculture 
contributes to 41% of impaired water quality in lakes.  Animal feedlots were among the 
top ten contributors to ground water quality problems in 17 states and agriculture was 
ranked fifth among contributors to water quality impairment of estuaries (EPA, 2000).  
The EPA (2003) cites runoff from animal manure produced in the Mississippi River 
                                                 
3 State 305(b) Reports are required under the Clean Water Act. 
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Basin as a significant contributor to the hypoxic zone in the northern Gulf of Mexico.4  
The EPA identified over 150 reports of surface water discharges from livestock 
operations, including 30 reports in Iowa between 1992 and 1997.  Each of the Iowa 
reports resulted in between 500 and 500,000 fish kills.   
Over one half of the US population gets its drinking water from groundwater 
sources.  Groundwater accounts for 40% of the water withdrawn by cities and towns and 
virtually all of the water used by private users is groundwater (Nolan and Stoner, 2000), 
implying that significant portions of rural citizens are affected by groundwater quality.  
Excessive nitrates in drinking water can cause potentially fatal low oxygen levels in 
infants and high nitrate levels have been associated with spontaneous abortions and 
increased risk of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (Nolan and Stoner, 2000).   A specific 
example of groundwater contamination by livestock manure is found in southern 
Delaware, where a study found 34% of 200 wells sampled exceeded the EPA drinking 
water standard for nitrogen.  Land application of poultry wastes was cited as one of the 
major contributing factors to the high nitrogen concentrations (Sharpley, et al, 1998).   
 
1.1.2 Manure Nutrient Production 
Over the past twenty years production in the US intensive livestock sector has 
increasingly intensified.  Between 1982 and 1997, the number confined animal farms in 
the US decreased by 27% to 529,658 while the number of confined animal units 
increased by approximately 7% over the same period (Kellogg, et al., 2000).  The USDA 
estimates that the largest decrease in confined animal farm numbers occurred in the hog 
                                                 
4 A hypoxic zone is one where the dissolved oxygen content of water is below the level needed to sustain animal life. 
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sector, where the number of confined farms declined by 64% between 1982 and 1997.  
The number of farms with confined fattened cattle, confined dairy cattle, and confined 
poultry declined by 52%, 47%, and 46% respectively.  Over the same period, the 
aggregate number of large confined animal operations increased by approximately 21% 
(Kellogg, et al., 2000).5   
Coinciding with the increasingly intensified nature of livestock production has 
been an increase in the production of manure nutrients.  During the fifteen-year period 
between 1982 and 1997 total US manure nutrient production increased by 20% (Kellogg, 
et al., 2000).  The increase in manure nutrient production was accompanied by a shift in 
the spatial concentration of intensive livestock production; in 1997 fewer counties 
accounted for the majority of US manure nutrient production for each of the livestock 
types as compared to 1982.   
An increase in the concentration of manure nutrient production has had 
impacts on the ability of regions to assimilate all of the manure nutrients 
produced.  Kellogg, et al. (2000) estimated that in 1997, 78% of ILOs had 
the potential ability to assimilate all manure nitrogen and 69% had the 
potential ability to assimilate all the manure phosphorus their operations 
produced.6  Averaged across all size classes, the available cropland and 
pastureland controlled by these intensive livestock operations declined 
from 3.6 acres per animal unit (AU) in 1982 to 2.2 acres per animal unit in 
1997.  Large operations had 0.2 acres of cropland and pastureland per 
animal unit in 1997 (Kellogg, et al., 2000).   
Reductions in the assimilative capacity utilized by intensive livestock producers 
have had implications regarding the levels of excess nutrients produced.  Kellogg, et al. 
(2000) estimated the 1992 and 1997 county-level excess nutrients produced by ILOs 
across the US.  These estimates find that county level excess nitrogen and phosphorus 
                                                 
5 An operation with over 300 AUs is classified as large by Kellogg, et al.   
6 Kellogg, et al. calculated farm-level assimilative capacity based on the ability of the farms cropland and pastureland 
to utilize manure nutrients.  Excess soil manure nutrients occur when the quantity of manure produced on a given farm 
exceeds that farms assimilative capacity. This does not imply that these operations are managing manure in a manner 
that does not create excess nutrients, only that they have the assimilative capacity available to utilize all manure 
nutrients their operations produce.    
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increased by 60% between 1982 and 1997.  Poultry operations accounted for over 60% of 
the on-farm excess nitrogen and over half of on-farm excess phosphorus.  Assuming 
export of manure nutrients from the farm, but within the county, 73 counties had excess 
nitrogen and 160 counties had excess phosphorus.  Kellogg, et al. (2000) find that the 
number of counties with excess nitrogen has increased by 103% between 1982 and 1997 
and the number of counties with excess phosphorus has increased by 58% in the same 
period.   
 
1.1.3 Importance in the Rural Economy  
The EPA (2002) estimated that in 1997 the US intensive livestock industry 
accounted for over 1.6 million full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs in the US, including both 
farm-level employment and employment in the processing sector.7  This represents 
approximately 1% of nationwide US FTE employment.  Figure 1.1 provides a graphical 
summary of the intensive livestock industries contribution to regional FTE employment 
in the US by livestock type.  As expected, aggregate FTE employment by region is 
greatest in the Midwest, the traditional US livestock production region.   
In 1997, the beef sector accounted for 336,700 FTE farm level jobs and 145,617 
FTE processor jobs.  The majority of regional farm and processing employment in the 
beef sector was in the Midwest, which accounted for over half of total beef sector 
employment.  Employment totals in the central region followed those in the Midwest, 
accounting for 40% of beef sector employment.  National employment in the dairy sector 
accounted for approximately 38% of aggregate intensive livestock employment, three 
quarters of which was farm level.  Together, the Midwest, Pacific, and Mid-Atlantic 
                                                 
7 1 FTE = 2,080 hours of labour. 
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regions accounted for 80% of dairy sector employment.  Hog production contributed 
280,623 FTE jobs to the US economy, 67% of which were in the traditional hog 
production region of the Midwest.  The Mid-Atlantic region accounted for 20% of hog 
sector FTE employment in 1997.  In contrast to the other intensive livestock sectors, the 
majority of employment in the poultry sector was in the processing sector.  In 1997, 74% 
of the 276,000 FTE jobs in the poultry sector were at the processor level.  Over 55% of 
poultry sector employment was in the South, followed by the Mid-Atlantic, which had 
25% of poultry sector employment.    
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Figure 1.1: 1997 Regional US FTE employment (EPA, 2002) 
 
As stated earlier, the total number of large confined animal operations in the US 
increased by 21% between 1982 and 1997.  The number of large CAFOs by state, as 
estimated by the EPA (2002), provides additional information regarding the relative 
importance of the various livestock sectors to the economies of each state in the year 
2000.  In the beef sector, Nebraska, Kansas and Texas had the largest number of large 
 9
beef CAFOs, Nebraska having the most at 591.  Large-scale dairy production occurred 
most in California (763 large operations), New York (346 large operations), and 
Wisconsin (267 large operations).  Between 1982 and 1997, of the four livestock sectors, 
hog production experienced the greatest increase in the number of large operations 
(Kellogg, et al., 2000).  In 2000, Iowa had 1,236 large hog animal feeding operations, 
followed by North Carolina, which had 1,076 large operations.  Minnesota, Illinois, and 
Indiana had between 400 and 600 large-scale hog operations each.  As mentioned 
previously, poultry operations contribute to a significant amount of the excess manure 
nutrients produced by intensive livestock.  States with the largest number of large poultry 
operations were Georgia (512 large operations), Arkansas (372 large operations), and 
Alabama (338 large operations).   
 
1.1.4 Excess Manure Nutrients and Large CAFOs 
Increases in the production of excess nutrients have been greatest in the Southeast 
and the mid-Atlantic regions of the US (EPA, 2003).  The EPA attributes the increase in 
excess nutrients in these regions to the expansion of large hog and poultry operations 
between 1982 and 1997, listing North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, California, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington as 
the states with the greatest excess nutrient concerns.  The states with the greatest excess 
nutrient concerns, as defined by the EPA (2003), are presented in Table 1.1 below, 
indicating the number of large operations in each sector that are located in that state.  The 
data indicates that large-scale poultry production is a potential concern in the Southern 
states, along with large-scale hog production in North Carolina and to a lesser degree 
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Arkansas and Virginia.  Large-scale beef and dairy production appears to be the cause of 
excess nutrient problems in California and Washington.  Problems in Maryland, 
Delaware, and Pennsylvania are the result of large-scale poultry (MD and DE) and dairy 
(PA) production.    
 
Table 1.1: Number of Large CAFOs by Selected State and Sector 
State Beef Dairy Hogs Poultry Total 
North Carolina 2 56 1076 263 1397 
California 102 763 11 133 1009 
Georgia 0 61 54 512 627 
Arkansas 0 8 106 372 486 
Pennsylvania 6 135 135 186 462 
Alabama 0 17 16 338 371 
Virginia 2 65 19 117 203 
Mississippi 0 17 17 225 259 
Washington 53 103 4 38 198 
Maryland 0 31 11 84 126 
Delaware 2 6 4 58 70 
Source: EPA (2002) 
 
 
1.1.5 Environmental Regulation  
EPA federal regulation of US animal feeding operations, under the authority of 
the Clean Water Act, dates back to the 1970s.  The EPA established national effluent 
limitation guidelines in 1974 and began the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) in 1976.  The national effluent guidelines established by the EPA 
applied to animal feeding operations greater than 1,000 animal units (AUs).  These 
guidelines, based on the best available technology that was economically achievable in 
the 1970s, had the objective of prohibiting the discharge of effluent into water sources 
except in the case of a 25 year, 24 hour storm (EPA, 2003).  NPDES permits were 
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assigned to all CAFOs greater than 1,000 AUs.  Additionally, any animal feeding 
operation between 300 and 1,000 AUs was required to obtain a permit if they “discharged 
pollutants through a man made device or if pollutants were discharged to the waters of 
the US that ran through the facility or otherwise came into contact with the confined 
animals” (EPA, 2003, p. 7186).   
While EPA regulation of the intensive livestock sector established base national 
requirements, responsibility for the enforcement of federal regulations was assigned to 
state governments (Metcalfe, 2001).  In addition to the enforcement of federal 
regulations, state governments developed and implemented their own regulations.     
Metcalfe (2000) examined the regulatory stringency of the intensive livestock industry in 
the major hog producing states for the years 1994 and 1998.  Metcalfe found that the 
average stringency of regulations increased between 1994 and 1998.  The stringency of 
regulations was assumed to increase as the number of regulations imposed on the 
intensive livestock industry increases.  For example, public notice requirements and 
provisions allowing for local control were assumed to increase the stringency of 
regulations.  The presence and the severity of setback requirements, NMPs, and 
requirements for groundwater monitoring also increased the stringency of regulations.  
On the other hand, state cost share programs reduced the compliance costs of the ILO 
industry, therefore reducing the stringency of regulations.  Table 1.2 presents the state 
regulatory stringency index totals as constructed and presented by Metcalfe (2000).   
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Table 1.2: State environmental regulatory stringency index 
State 1994 Index Total 1998 Index Total 
Georgia 8 12 
Kansas 4 12 
South Carolina - 12 
Illinois 3 11 
Iowa 5 11 
Mississippi 6 11 
Arkansas 12 10 
Maryland - 10 
Minnesota 9 10 
Missouri 8 10 
North Carolina 3 10 
South Dakota 4 10 
Nebraska 3 9 
Kentucky 3 8 
Oklahoma 9 8 
Pennsylvania 5 8 
Indiana 4 7 
Ohio 10 7 
Oregon - 7 
Tennessee - 7 
Virginia 3 7 
Colorado - 6 
Michigan 4 2 
New York 4 1 
Source: Metcalfe (2000).  
 
 
Comparison of the regulatory stringency indices developed by Metcalfe reveals 
that a large amount of new regulatory activity was initiated in the intensive livestock 
sector between 1994 and 1998.  A survey conducted by the National Animal 
Confinement Policy Task Force (NACPTF) in 1998 found evidence of a significant 
amount of public controversy regarding intensive livestock production (Edelman, et al., 
1999).  The survey indicated that intensive livestock production was the subject of 
increased incidences of conflict and attention in the media in 39 of the 46 conterminous 
states surveyed.  Within almost half of the conterminous states surveyed, new legislation 
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regarding ILOs had been proposed during the past year.  The rank order of livestock type 
generating the most controversy nationwide is as follows: hogs, dairy, poultry, and beef.  
In Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, and Vermont poultry is the largest generator 
of controversy.  The dairy industry generates the most controversy in Arizona, California, 
Florida, Idaho, Maine, Nevada, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Of the 46 
conterminous states surveyed, 44 indicated that state agencies are responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of intensive livestock environmental regulations.    
  
1.1.6 Case Study: Intensive Livestock Production in North Carolina  
Development of the pork industry in North Carolina is often cited as an example 
of the trade off between rural economic development and the environment.  Legislators 
view development of the hog industry as “the force that is keeping jobs and money in 
counties where tobacco is fading” (The News and Observer, 1996, p. 15).  Between 1980 
and 1993, hog production in North Carolina increased by 109%, involving an investment 
estimated at $180 million and the addition of 2,000 jobs (Kenyon, 1994).  
Environmentally, the North Carolina hog industry has been scrutinized as a less than 
ideal steward of the environment.  An oft-cited example of the environmental dangers of 
hog production occurred in 1995 when over 40 million gallons of untreated manure 
escaped lagoons at seven North Carolina hog operations due to flooding.  The spill 
resulted in 15 million fish kills off North Carolina’s coastal plain due to nutrient over-
enrichment (Nowlin, 1997).   
In the early 1990s, ILO compliance with environmental regulations was more 
costly in Virginia as compared to North Carolina (Kenyon, 1994).  Kenyon attributed the 
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trend of increasing hog production in North Carolina and decreasing hog production in 
Virginia to the relatively less stringent environmental regulations in North Carolina.  Hurt 
and Zering (1993) examined the environmental and regulatory constraints to hog 
expansion in North Carolina and found that they were relatively less restrictive compared 
to restrictions on hog expansion in the Midwest states of Illinois, Minnesota, and Indiana.  
Hurt and Zering also point to the importance of contract hog production to the expansion 
of the hog industry in North Carolina.  The expansion of the hog industry in North 
Carolina coincided with a declining tobacco industry, once the “King of Agriculture” in 
North Carolina.  Due to the decline of the tobacco industry, many small tobacco 
producers found hog production contracts to be an attractive way to stay on the farm.  
Despite high feed-grain costs, the costs of production were favourable in North Carolina, 
due to “lower building costs, low labour costs, lower waste disposal costs, perhaps lower 
interest rates, and lower transportation costs to move finished pork products to east coast 
markets” (Hurt and Zering, 1993, p. 13).       
In 1995, The News and Observer of Raleigh, North Carolina had a series of 
articles titled “Boss Hog: North Carolina’s Pork Revolution” (The News and Observer, 
1996) for which the paper was awarded the 1996 Pulitzer Prize for Public Service.  These 
articles outlined “the power of pork” in North Carolina, exposing the hog industry’s 
political connections with state legislators and the apparent link to the weak stringency of 
intensive livestock environmental regulations in that state.  In particular, the actions of 
Wendell Murphy, who is both a legislator and the largest hog producer in the US, are 
scrutinized.  The implication being that Murphy’s decisions on state legislation 
concerning the hog industry was biased due to his financial interests in the industry he 
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was legislating.  In an analysis of the political influence of the North Carolina hog 
industry, former North Carolina Senator Robert Morgan (1998) states: 
The hog industry’s growing political power was due not only to the efforts 
of individual legislators such as Senator Murphy, but to large and 
continuing contributions to candidates; it takes a great deal of money to 
get elected these days, and the industry was generous in its support of 
officials who might be able to help it in the future. 
 
Further, The News and Observer (1995) reports that political campaign 
contributions, totaling $439,719 since 1990, from hog industry interests were influential 
in determining the outcome of legislative decisions impacting the hog industry.  Sales tax 
exemptions, gas tax exemptions, property tax exemptions, weakened environmental 
penalties for hog manure discharges into streams, and restrictions on county zoning 
authority over hog and poultry production were among the legislative decisions that were 
favourable to North Carolina’s hog industry (The News and Observer, 1995).    
 
1.2 Specific Problem 
A number of studies have addressed the relationship between intensive livestock 
production and environmental regulations in the US (Metcalfe (2001), Roe, et al. (2002), 
Park, et al. (2002), and Herath, et al. (2003)).  Recognizing differences in regulatory 
stringency across US states, these studies have examined the impact of environmental 
regulations on intensive livestock production decisions.  These studies have not, however, 
explicitly modeled the political formation of intensive livestock environmental policy.   
The political formation of environmental policy outside of the agricultural sector 
has been examined in the wider economics literature.  The theoretical literature dealing 
with environmental policy, specifically the work of Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998), and 
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Schleich (1999), propose political economic models adapted from the work of Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) for trade protection.  The political economy approach to the 
determination of environmental policy finds that the government balances a number of 
different objectives, including aggregate social welfare, when setting policy.  The weight 
the government places on these different objectives determines the stringency of 
regulations.  For example, in Damania, et al. (2003), Fredriksson, et al. (2003), and 
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), a corrupt government is considered to place greater 
weight on the campaign contributions it receives from industry relative to the weight it 
assigns to aggregate social welfare, potentially leading to less than optimal environmental 
regulation.   
As outlined earlier, the formation of environmental policy in the intensive 
livestock sector is partly dependent on the relative weight the incumbent government 
places on environmental quality relative to the pressure for rural economic development.  
An incumbent government in a region where recent economic growth has been relatively 
low may be under greater pressure to foster rural economic development.  Conversely, an 
incumbent government in a region recently experiencing high economic growth may be 
under less pressure to increase rural economic development and has greater political 
ability to protect environmental quality.  The short-run trade-off between environmental 
quality and rural economic development in the formation of intensive livestock 
environmental regulations is the focus of this thesis. 
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1.3 Hypothesis 
The stringency of environmental regulations in the US intensive livestock sector 
is dependent on the pressure for rural economic development; the greater the pressure for 
rural economic development, the lower the stringency of environmental regulations, 
ceteris paribus.  Formally stated, the hypothesis of this thesis is as follows: 
HBo B: recent rural economic growth has no effect on the stringency of ILO 
environmental regulations  
HBaB: recent rural economic growth has a positive effect on the stringency of 
ILO environmental regulations  
 
The theoretical model presented in this thesis will lay the foundation for the empirical 
examination of this hypothesis.   
 
1.4 Objectives  
The objective of this thesis is to develop a theoretical economic model explaining 
the determination of the stringency of environmental policy as it relates to the intensive 
livestock industry.  Specific objectives are as follows: 
• Test the relationship between the pressure for rural economic development and 
ILO environmental regulations 
• Examine the above relationship in the context of the power of environmental 
groups, the potential environmental damages from ILO production, and the size of 
the ILO industry 
• Account for the potentially endogenous relationship between intensive livestock 
inventory and ILO environmental regulation 
 
 
1.5 Scope of Thesis 
This thesis will provide a state-level empirical examination of the US intensive 
livestock industry, comprised of the beef cattle, dairy cattle, hog, and chicken sectors.  
The determination of 1997 environmental regulatory stringency in the US intensive 
livestock industry will be examined.  Following previously published literature, this 
thesis will account for the potentially endogenous relationship between intensive 
livestock inventory and regulatory stringency.  The theoretical aspect of this thesis 
focuses on the determination of environmental regulatory stringency.   
 
1.6 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Following the introduction, Chapter 2 will 
present a review of the literature pertinent to ILO environmental regulation.  The 
literature review describes the economic models to be used in this thesis, followed by an 
examination of the literature dealing with intensive livestock inventory and ILO 
environmental regulations.   
The theoretical framework for this thesis is presented in Chapter 3.  A theoretical 
model is built, based on the models explaining environmental policy formation and the 
characteristics of the US intensive livestock sector as described in the literature review.  
A number of predictions are derived from the theoretical model.  These predictions form 
the base of the testable hypotheses in the empirical research aspect of this thesis.  Chapter 
4 outlines the methods and procedures used in this thesis.  The chapter begins with a 
general econometric specification, followed by a description of the data requirements and 
more detailed econometric specifications.  Alternative specifications are proposed in 
order to test the robustness of the preferred specification.   
Chapter 5 presents the econometric results of the preferred specification and the 
alternative specifications.  The chapter concludes with a comparison of the results of this 
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chapter with the results published in other academic studies.  A summary of the research 
presented in this thesis is provided in Chapter 6.  Study limitations and prospects for 
future research are discussed, followed by concluding statements.    
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
This chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical literature concerning the 
political economy of trade protection and environmental policy and the empirical 
literature examining the determination of environmental policy.  The chapter concludes 
with an examination of the literature dealing with the impact of environmental 
regulations on the location decisions of polluting firms.  Location studies dealing with 
polluting industries outside of agriculture are considered first, followed by a more 
detailed examination of the spatial pattern of the US livestock industry. 
 
2.1 Political Economy Model of Trade Protection 
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model (hereafter G-H model) of the political 
economy of trade protection provides the basis for the theoretical framework used in this 
thesis.  Grossman and Helpman “view politicians as maximizing agents who pursue their 
own selfish interests rather than as benevolent agents seeking to maximize aggregate 
welfare” (p. 848).  Formally, the G-H model considers the interaction between an 
incumbent government that cares both about campaign contributions and aggregate 
welfare and special interest groups solely concerned about the welfare of their members.   
The theoretical basis of the G-H model is the first-price menu auction developed 
by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).  Bernheim and Whinston examine competitive 
 21
bidding where the object is partially divisible.  The bidders make a set of offers to the 
auctioneer for various allocations of the divisible object.  This situation is classified as a 
first price menu auction under the assumption of complete information.  Lemma 2 (p. 10) 
characterizes the Nash equilibrium, the two conditions of primary importance being as 
follows.  First, the auctioneer chooses the allocation that maximizes its own welfare.  
Second, in the equilibrium allocation each individual bidder maximizes the joint welfare 
of the auctioneer and the individual bidder.  Bernheim and Whinston further develop the 
analysis to find that a truthful Nash equilibrium emerges where each bidder offers 
rewards based on the net willingness-to-pay for that action.8   
Bernheim and Whinston apply their model of first-price menu auctions to a 
number of situations, one of which is a situation of economic influence where interested 
parties offer contingent bribes to a decision maker.  They find that “parties who can 
compensate agents at low cost will have more influence, yet the action chosen will 
nevertheless remain Pareto efficient” (p. 22).  Also, the payoff to the decision maker 
increases with the level of conflict between bidders.  In terms of political economy, this 
model shows that interest groups that are relatively more efficient at lobbying the 
government will have more influence.9  This application finds that the action chosen is 
Pareto efficient for the parties involved, but does not model the welfare effects on parties 
outside of the menu auction of economic influence.  The conclusion that increased 
conflict among bidders increases the payoff to the auctioneer makes intuitive sense in 
terms of political economy; the greater the competition between interest groups, the 
greater the ‘market power’ of the incumbent government.   
                                                 
8 Net willingness-to-pay is equal to the difference between the bidder’s gross payoffs from alternative allocations.   
9 Efficient lobbying may be the result of lower coordination costs or of the weight that the government places on the 
interest groups welfare relative to other interest groups. 
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The G-H model extends the first-price menu auction presented in Bernheim and 
Whinston to an analysis of the formation of trade protection policy.  The G-H model 
explains the equilibrium outcome of a political process wherein interest groups attempt to 
influence trade policy decisions and incumbent politicians trade off the financial 
incentives offered by special interest groups with the alienation of the electorate that 
results from economically inefficient trade policies.  The G-H model finds the Nash 
equilibrium of this political process: the incumbent government trades off the aggregate 
welfare of society with campaign contributions.  The trade off implies that the 
government weights different members of society differently, with those represented by 
special interest groups receiving a larger weight than those who are not.   
Grossman and Helpman examine the case of a single organized lobby and the 
resulting determination of equilibrium campaign contributions.  A single organized 
interest group, representing the specific-factor owners in a given industry, will lobby the 
incumbent government for trade protection.  If this lobby makes no contributions, the 
government will implement the free trade policy.  Contributions from the lobby 
compensate the government proportional to the weight the government places on the 
deadweight loss resulting from deviations from free trade.  The government is therefore 
indifferent between receiving campaign contributions and implementing the free trade 
policy.  As a result, the special interest group captures the entire surplus resulting from its 
lobbying activities.   
Alternatively, Grossman and Helpman consider the situation where all voters are 
represented by special interests.  In this case each lobby must make positive campaign 
contributions.  Due to the intensity of competition between interest groups, the 
government is able to capture all surplus.  As in Bernheim and Whinston, the outcome is 
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Pareto efficient; maximization of the joint surplus involves all members of society and 
the free trade policy is implemented.   
 
2.2 Political Economy of Environmental Policy 
2.2.1 Theoretical Models of Environmental Policy Formation 
Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998), and Schleich (1999) extend the G-H model to 
examine the political economy of environmental policy.  These models examine the 
impacts of special interest lobbying on endogenous pollution taxes in small open 
economy settings.  The Fredriksson model specifically examines the effects of lobby 
group membership, the importance of lobbying activities, and the tax elasticity of 
pollution.  Aidt specifically examines the impact of competition between lobby groups on 
the internalization of economic externalities.  In the model proposed by Aidt, lobby 
groups are concerned both with economic efficiency and the distribution of income, 
which leads to deviations from the Pigouvian tax.  Schleich examines the political 
determination of environmental policy in the cases of decreasing, constant, and 
increasing marginal environmental damages.  Lopez and Mitra (2000) and Damania 
(2001) present interesting theoretical extensions of the political economy models of 
environmental policy.  Lopez and Mitra consider the formation of environmental policy 
in the presence of corruption, while Damania examines the political economy of 
investment in pollution abatement technology. 
Fredriksson (1997) models special interest competition between industry and 
environmental special interest groups in the presence of abatement technology.  As in the 
G-H model, an incumbent government cares only about re-election and the probability of 
 24
re-election depends on aggregate social welfare and aggregate campaign contributions.  
Whereas the G-H model examined an incumbent government making choices regarding 
the trade policies affecting a number of different industries, Fredriksson examines the 
formation of the environmental policy governing a single industry with competition 
between industry and environmental special interest.  Environmentalists’ utility is 
adversely affected by the pollution damages associated with the production of the good 
produced by the industrialist.  The industrialist, on the other hand, derives no disutility 
from consumption of the polluting good.  The incumbent government has the power to 
implement pollution taxes on the production of the polluting good.  Aggregate social 
utility is maximized when the pollution tax equals the marginal disutility from 
pollution.10  The environmental and the industrial interest groups form lobbies and offer 
campaign contributions to the government commensurate with the benefits they expect to 
receive from the incumbent government.  The incumbent government then makes a trade-
off between the campaign contributions offered by the special interest groups and the 
aggregate welfare of society.  This trade-off is based on the exogenously determined 
weight the government places on aggregate social welfare relative to campaign 
contributions.    
 Under the assumption of constant marginal damages, Fredriksson finds that 
environmental quality is reduced in the presence of a polluting industry lobby.  
Fredriksson finds that the pollution tax is decreasing in the world market price and  
increasing in lobby group membership.  The pollution tax increases in industry lobby 
group membership if total tax revenue is increasing in the tax rate.  As industry lobby 
                                                 
10 The marginal disutility from pollution is equal to the proportion of the population that derives disutility from 
pollution (the marginal disutility to society). 
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group membership increases a greater portion of the tax revenue passes back to the 
industry lobby group members.  In the extreme, if all citizens are members of the industry 
lobby group, then the tax rate is not a concern because all revenue is distributed back to 
the members.  In situations where the tax rate is less than socially optimal, Fredriksson 
finds that the pollution tax is increasing in the weight the government places on aggregate 
social welfare.   
Fredriksson further extends the model to allow for abatement technology and for a 
subsidy on pollution abatement.  Pollution damage is a function of the level of abatement 
expenditures, therefore treating pollution damages as endogenous.  Pollution abatement 
subsidies are potentially offered by the government in order to reduce the aggregate level 
of pollution.  Fredriksson claims that previous literature shows that the introduction of an 
abatement subsidy may induce increased entry resulting in increased total pollution 
damage.  Fredriksson finds that there may be an additional political effect of the 
abatement subsidy, namely that the pollution tax rate decreases in the abatement subsidy 
rate.  This implies that the “subsidy stimulates pollution both by an increase in supply 
through lower marginal abatement cost and by a reduction of the tax cost per unit of 
pollution” (p. 57).  The model presented by Fredriksson was the first to extend the G-H 
model to the political determination of environmental policy.  The majority of recent 
empirical work in the political economy of environmental policy is based on the model 
developed by Fredriksson.   
Aidt (1998) proposes that the political internalization of environmental 
externalities bridges the Coasian and Pigouvian approaches to environmental policy.  In 
the Coasian approach groups protect their respective interests via transfers.  In the model 
proposed by Aidt transfers occur within political markets as opposed to the private 
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transfers described by Coase.  Following the Pigouvian approach, a coercive government 
implements environmental policy with the maximization of aggregate social welfare in its 
objective function.   
Since the joint welfare of the interest groups and the government are maximized 
(as in Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) as opposed to aggregate social welfare, Aidt 
concludes that the environmental policy chosen may not reflect the socially optimal 
policy.  In addition, Aidt makes an interesting point regarding taxes versus direct 
regulation.  Aidt proposes that direct regulation prevails because small producer groups 
are more efficient in influencing policymakers than are ordinary citizens, who would 
prefer taxation due to the generation of tax revenue.      
Schleich (1999) allows for decreasing, constant and increasing marginal damages 
from pollution and models both production and consumption externalities, as well as 
domestic and trade policy options.  Schleich models an economy where all consumers 
suffer disutility from the consumption of a polluting good.  Industry lobby groups form 
and offer the incumbent government campaign contributions in order to influence 
government policy.  When making campaign contributions, each lobby group takes into 
account the effect government policies have on their members, including the disutility 
from consumption of the polluting good.  The model proposed by Schleich differs from 
the Fredriksson (1997) model in two important ways.  First, in the Schleich model, all 
individuals suffer disutility from pollution, implying that pollution is a global problem.  
Fredriksson models an economy where the industry lobby group suffers no disutility from 
pollution, implying that pollution is a local problem.  Second, Fredriksson considers the 
case of constant marginal damages, whereas Schleich extends the model of Fredriksson 
to include increasing and decreasing marginal damages.  The difference between the two 
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modeling approaches results in different conclusions regarding the presence of polluting 
industry lobbies on the equilibrium tax rate. 
Schleich introduces the concept of marginal political benefits and marginal 
political cost curves to help explain the determination of environmental policy in the 
presence of a polluting industry lobby.  Initial marginal political costs and marginal 
political benefits occur when no special interest groups are organized.  The initial 
equilibrium is the Pigouvian tax rate.  In the presence of a polluting industry lobby, 
marginal political benefits increase as the output price increases (the pollution tax 
decreases) due to increased industry lobby profitability.  Increased industry lobby 
profitability is transferred to the government in the form of campaign contributions.  On 
the margin, an increase in industry lobby profitability of one dollar corresponds with an 
increase in campaign contributions to the incumbent government of one dollar.  Marginal 
political costs also increase in the presence of a polluting industry lobby.  The industry 
lobby considers the impact the environmental policy will have on the welfare of its 
members.11  If the marginal pollution damages are constant or increasing, and the 
proportion of the industry lobby is less than one, the marginal benefit curve shifts up 
more than the marginal cost curve, and the equilibrium pollution tax is less than the 
Pigouvian rate.  If marginal pollution damages are decreasing, then the marginal political 
cost curve slopes downward.  If the marginal cost curve is decreasing at a faster rate than 
the decrease in marginal benefits, the presence of a polluting industry lobby causes the 
equilibrium pollution tax to be higher than the Pigouvian tax rate.   
  Lopez and Mitra (2000) examine the relationship between economic growth and 
the environment.  The Kuznets environment curve states that environmental degradation 
                                                 
11 Schleich assumes that every individual in society suffers disutility from pollution. 
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occurs at low levels of income but that this relationship changes once a threshold of 
income is passed.  This gives rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
environmental quality and income.  Empirical evidence provides support for this 
relationship regarding certain pollutants.  Nonetheless, empirical evidence regarding 
natural resources suggests the relationship between resource degradation and income is 
positive (Lopez and Mitra, 2000).   
Lopez and Mitra model both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions 
between governments and firms in the presence of government corruption and rent 
seeking behavior regarding the level of pollution and changes in these levels as income 
grows.  Results are consistent between the two types of interactions modeled:  corruption 
and rent seeking always lead to pollution greater than the socially optimal level, 
corruption does not prevent the existence of a Kuznets relationship, and the turning point 
in the Kuznets relationship occurs at higher per capita incomes and pollution levels.  In 
conclusion, Lopez and Mitra suggest the following.  Compared to developed countries, 
developing countries, such as China, Indonesia, and India, are experiencing high 
corruption levels.  Therefore, pollution will remain higher in these countries than it was 
in developed countries when they were at comparable levels of per capita incomes.  They 
note that this conclusion is dependent on the assumption that corruption will not fall as 
incomes rise.   
Damania (2001) finds that choice of technology and lobbying are substitutes in 
the profit function of firms.  The model demonstrates that older, dirtier industries will 
lobby the government for weaker environmental regulation rather than adopt newer, 
cleaner technology.  Older, dirtier industries are better positioned to lobby the 
government because they can demonstrate relatively high abatement costs, therefore 
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raising the welfare costs of stricter environmental policy.  This gives these firms an 
incentive to under-invest in pollution abatement technology.  The ability of firms to 
demonstrate a credible commitment to investment decisions is critical to Damania’s 
conclusions.    
       
2.2.2 Empirical Studies of Environmental Policy Formation 
Recent empirical examinations of environmental policy formation have been 
based on the theoretical model as presented by Fredriksson (1997).  Eliste and 
Fredriksson (2002) examine the relationship between environmental regulatory 
stringency and government subsidies to agriculture.  Damania, et al. (2003) adapt the 
Fredriksson model to a examine the relationship between trade policy, corruption, and 
environmental policy.  Government corruption determines the exogenous weight the 
incumbent government places on campaign contributions relative to aggregate social 
welfare.  Fredriksson, et al. (2003) inspect the pollution haven hypothesis by examining 
the relationship between bureaucratic corruption, environmental policy, and foreign 
direct investment.  Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) look at the relationship between 
political instability, government corruption, and environmental policy.  Further, 
Fredriksson, et al. (2004) examine the determination of environmental policy and its 
relationship to policy maker corruption and the relative incentives of worker and 
capitalist groups.    
The theoretical model developed by Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) predicts that 
increases in the stringency of environmental policy leads to increased transfers to the 
polluting industry.  Eliste and Fredriksson perform a cross-country empirical analysis of 
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the agricultural sector, examining this “compensation” hypothesis.  An index of the 
stringency of agricultural environmental regulations is developed and transfers to the 
agricultural sector are based on Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE) as developed by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  The authors employ 
two-stage least squares in order to account for the potential endogeneity of transfer 
payments to producers and environmental stringency.       
 The stringency of agricultural environmental regulations is found to have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on government transfer payments to 
agriculture.  The share of agricultural land in the total land base provides a measure of the 
environmental pressures due to agricultural production.  Eliste and Fredriksson found a 
positive relationship between the stringency of environmental regulations and the share 
of agricultural land in the total land base.  Per capita income was used as a proxy for the 
demand for environmental quality.  The relationship between per capita income and 
regulatory stringency was found to be positive.  Agricultures share of the national 
economy, measured by the share of agricultural labour as a percent of total labour, has a 
negative impact on the stringency of environmental regulations applied to agriculture.  
Econometric results find that PSE is an insignificant variable in the determination of 
agricultural environmental policy. 
The compensation hypothesis is tested by the PSE equation.  PSE is a function of 
environmental stringency, the importance of agriculture in the national economy, the 
value added per hectare of agricultural land (a reflection of the elasticity of production 
supply across countries), and the influence of democracy on the level of protection 
granted to the agricultural sector.  The empirical analysis of the PSE equation finds that 
the stringency of agricultural environmental regulations has a positive impact on transfers 
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to the agriculture sector, supporting the compensation hypothesis.  The share of 
agriculture in the labour force is insignificant as are the democracy variables.  The proxy 
for supply elasticity is positive and significant, indicating that the cost of redistribution 
falls as supply elasticity falls.    
Damania, et al. (2003) model the interactions between trade policy, corruption 
and environmental policy.  Their empirical analysis is based on allowable lead content in 
gasoline measured across both developed and developing countries.  Greater lead content 
in gasoline is assumed to represent less stringent environmental regulation.  In general, 
greater openness to trade, measured as the share of exports and imports as a proportion of 
GDP, leads to stricter environmental regulations.  The proxy for corruption is a 
government honesty index; government honesty and corruption are inversely related.  
The study finds that greater government corruption reduces environmental stringency and 
that the level of corruption tends to amplify the impacts of trade openness on 
environmental stringency.  For example, in relatively closed economies the negative 
impact of corruption on environmental policy is magnified.  Protectionism and corruption 
are found to be complements in the determination of environmental regulations.       
In related work, Fredriksson, et al. (2003) examine the relationship between 
bureaucratic corruption, environmental policy and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
United States.  They analyze state-level panel data for the years 1977 to 1987.  The first 
objective of the research is to examine the determination of FDI inflows across the U.S. 
states, and the influence of environmental standards and public expenditures on those 
inflows.  The second objective is to evaluate the role of corruption in environmental 
policy determination and public spending.  Levinson’s (2001) index of state 
environmental compliance costs is used as the proxy for environmental standards and 
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non-military government gross state product (GSP) and highway mileage serve as the 
proxies for public spending.  The number of bureaucratic convictions per 1000 
bureaucrats in a state is used to measure corruption within states.  Instrumental variables 
control for the potential endogeneity of environmental standards and government GSP.  
Corruption, per capita state GSP, the share of legal services in GSP, non-military 
government employment, and tax effort are used as instruments for both environmental 
standards and government GSP.   
The pollution haven hypothesis proposes that FDI will be negatively affected by 
more stringent environmental standards.  The analysis by Fredriksson, et al. (2003) finds 
a U-shaped relationship between FDI and environmental stringency.  This may be 
explained in part by the findings of Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) outlined above.  States 
with more stringent regulations may attract FDI with transfer payments, thereby 
overcompensating polluting firms, and contributing to the positive sloped part of the U-
shaped relationship.  Highway infrastructure has positive impacts on the FDI in a state, 
while the relationship for government GSP is insignificant.  The study further examines 
new firm location data using a negative binomial specification for discrete plant births.12  
When accounting for the endogeneity of environmental policy and public spending, this 
specification finds a negative relationship between environmental stringency and foreign-
owned new plant births.  It also finds that highway mileage and government GSP are 
statistically significant determinants of new plant births.       
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) examine the relationship between political 
instability, corruption, and environmental policy formation.  Political instability and 
corruption are found to interact with each other in the determination of environmental 
                                                 
12 Fredriksson, et al. (2003) use the term ‘births’ to refer to the event of a new manufacturing plant locating in a region. 
 33
policy.  For example, increased corruption reduces the stringency of environmental 
regulations conditional on the degree of political instability.  As political instability 
increases, the impact of corruption on environmental policy is reduced.  Also, the impact 
of instability on environmental policy depends on corruptibility.  Greater instability in the 
political system makes the producer lobby less likely to bribe because the government 
has less chance to implement the desired policy.  The government, on the other hand, sees 
bribes as relatively more attractive as instability increases because they are less likely to 
have the opportunity to implement the policy.  The impact of instability increases as 
corruptibility decreases.   
In the Fredriksson and Svensson empirical analysis an equation explaining 
environmental policy is specified, independent variables including controls, political 
instability, corruption and an interaction term between instability and corruption.  This is 
a cross sectional analysis of 60 countries for the year 1990.  The stringency of 
environmental policy is measured by the index of agricultural sector environmental 
policies used in the Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) study mentioned above.  Corruption 
measures are based on an index roughly measuring the extent to which government 
members expect illegal payments.  Instability is measured as ‘governmental crises,’ 
defined as rapidly developing situations likely to cause the present government to topple.  
The set of controls includes per capita income as a proxy for the demand for 
environmental quality, the lobbying strength of agriculture measured by the share of 
employment in agriculture, and dummy variables for industrial countries and 
democracies.  Econometric results indicate that per capita income and the dummy for 
industrialized countries are significant and positively related to environmental stringency.  
The relationship between the share of employment in agriculture and stringency is 
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ambiguous and lacks statistical significance.  The democracy dummy also lacks 
significance and is negative.  Corruption and political instability are negatively related to 
environmental stringency, their interaction term having a positive impact on stringency.   
Fredriksson, et al. (2004) examine the relationship between policy maker 
corruption, the incentives of worker and capitalist interest groups, and the determination 
of environmental policy.  A number of theoretical predictions are tested: one, greater 
corruptibility reduces environmental stringency, two, greater lobby group coordination 
costs cause more stringent environmental policy, and three, if the wage effects of a policy 
are large, then the impact of worker coordination costs compared to capital owner 
coordination costs on environmental policy is relatively larger (the converse is also true).  
Environmental policy stringency is the dependent variable in this study, measured as 
sector energy efficiency over 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries between 1982 and 1996.  
A transparency index is used to measure corruptibility.  Capital owner and worker 
coordination costs are measured as the industry sectors contribution to total value added 
and the share of workers employed in a particular sector respectively.  The model 
predicts that an interest groups stake in the policy outcome will determine the bribery 
effort of the sectors interest groups.  As the share of total energy used by a sector 
increases, that sectors stake in policy increases.  Interaction variables between the share 
of total energy used by a sector and the value added and employment shares therefore 
account for the stakes of interest groups in energy policy.  Per capita GDP controls for 
the demand for environmental quality while oil prices, electricity prices, production 
worker wages, and the cost of capital control for different structures of energy production 
across countries.  The demand for environmental quality is expected to have a negative 
impact on energy intensity.  Oil and electricity costs should be negatively related to 
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energy intensity while labour and capital costs should have a positive impact on energy 
intensity.   
Corruptibility is found to have positive impacts on energy intensity and is 
significant at the 1% level.  Capital owner interest groups are found to experience 
increasing coordination costs as the size of the sector increases.  Workers in relatively 
large sectors are found to benefit from less stringent energy policy, but this effect is 
decreasing in sector employment size.  The analysis suggests that the coordination costs 
of worker interest groups increase with greater corruptibility.  The coordination costs of 
capital owners become less important if the sector has a greater stake in energy policy 
and the opposite is true for worker interest groups.  In summary, corruption and energy 
share differences between sectors reduce capital owner coordination costs and increase 
the coordination costs of workers.  The authors also provide empirical support for the 
hypothesis that the relative impacts of worker lobby groups versus capital owner groups 
are negatively related. 
 
2.3 Environmental Policy and Industry Location 
The relationship between industry location and environmental regulations has 
been the subject of a number of studies.  This relationship is important to this thesis 
because of the potential endogeneity between regulatory stringency and ILO production.  
Of particular interest is the impact of heterogeneous environmental regulations on the 
location choices of polluting industries.  The following section will briefly outline studies 
of the relationship between polluting industry location decisions and the stringency of 
 36
environmental regulations.  The second section will look at location studies specific to 
the ILO sector.   
 
2.3.1 Environmental Policy and the Manufacturing Industry 
 McConnell and Schwab (1990) provide an examination of the impact of the 
regional variation in environmental regulations on firm location decisions.  The empirical 
model examines the impact of county characteristics on the location of 50 new branch 
plants in the motor vehicle industry between 1973 and 1982.  Conducting the study at the 
county-level allows the authors to capture the distinction between regions that were in 
attainment of ozone standards in the 1970’s.13  Firms located in non-attainment areas 
were assumed to be subject to more stringent air quality regulation.  Results of the 
analysis are mixed.  In most cases, environmental regulations are found to have no effect 
on location decisions in the motor vehicle industry.  The authors do find evidence that 
firms are deterred from locating in regions where pollution problems are quite severe 
leading to high compliance costs.   
Henderson (1996) examines the impact of air quality regulation on industrial 
location.  The regulation of ground level ozone is examined, specifically addressing, 
among other issues, the extent to which polluting plants tend to move towards regions 
with weaker air quality regulations.  The author performs a panel data examination of the 
effect of attainment status on the location decisions of the major polluting industries in 
742 urban counties between 1978 and 1987.  The empirical analysis finds that polluting 
industries move towards areas with records of staying in attainment.  Henderson suggests 
                                                 
13 A region that has ‘stayed in attainment’ has a relatively cleaner record than one that has not stayed in attainment.  
Polluting firms in ‘in attainment’ regions are likely subjected to less regulatory scrutiny. 
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that polluting firms move to regions that have a clean record in order to reduce the 
regulatory scrutiny they are subjected to.  The effect of this practice is to relocate source 
emissions rather than eliminate them.      
 List and Co. (2000) examine the relationship between foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and environmental regulation across states in the US between 1986 and 1993.  Four 
proxies for environmental regulations are proposed, including state government spending 
on pollution regulation, firm-level pollution abatement operating expenditures, and an 
environmental protection index.  Control variables include population density, a proxy 
for agglomeration economies, manufacturing wages, percentage of unionized workers, 
energy costs, the number of heating and cooling degree days per year, state tax effort, and 
state promotional expenditures.  All models estimated find that environmental regulations 
have a negative and statistically significant impact on inbound FDI. 
  
2.3.2 Environmental Policy and the Intensive Livestock Industry 
 Metcalfe (2001) provides an analysis of US hog production and the influence of 
water quality regulation.  Two proxies are proposed for the stringency of water quality 
regulations.  The first is state spending on water quality and the second is an index 
derived from the survey conducted by the Animal Confinement Policy National Task 
Force (ACPNTF) (Edelman, et al. 1999).14  State hog supply is dependent on the price of 
inputs, transportation costs, and output prices.  Endogeneity of hog prices and the 
environmental input price (stringency of regulation) is accounted for with the following 
                                                 
14 Formed in 1998, the ACPNTF consisted of a group of extension agricultural economists from a dozen land grant 
universities chaired by Mark Edelman from Iowa State University.  The ACPNTF surveyed individuals from land grant 
universities and state agencies with expertise in the area of animal waste and related animal feeding operation 
regulations.  The survey is referred to as the National Survey of Animal Confinement Policies (NSACP). 
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instruments.  Chicken and cattle prices are the exogenous instruments for hog price.  
Population density, income level, and the amount of water pollution intensive industry 
serve as instruments for environmental input price.  Metcalfe also controls for differences 
in the regional effects of environmental regulations and for differences in the ability of 
hog operations of different size to adapt to environmental regulations.  The results 
indicate that environmental regulations have a negative impact on the hog inventory 
levels of smaller operations.  Large operations, on the other hand, do not show evidence 
of decreasing inventories in response to more stringent regulations.  Rather, Metcalfe 
finds that proximity to export points and agglomeration economies are driving changes in 
hog inventory.   
 Roe, et al. (2002) perform an analysis of the spatial structure of hog production in 
the US using county level data.  This study focuses on the intraregional distribution of 
hog production, proposing a reduced form model that estimates the impact of firm 
specific, locality specific, and spatial agglomeration factors.  The authors consider several 
categories of variables, sector and industry agglomeration proxies, urban encroachment 
indicators, local economic variables, input availability variables, firm productivity and 
specialization indicators, market access measures, and regulatory variables.   
 Roe, et al. (2002) formulate three models, explaining three dependent variables 
(the natural logarithm of total county hog inventory, the change in the natural logarithm 
of total county hog inventory between 1992 and 1997, and the natural logarithm of the 
average number of hogs per farm).  Metcalfe’s regulatory stringency index for both 1994 
and 1998 are used as proxies for the state level cost of environmental inputs.  The 
econometric model finds that 1997 county-level hog inventory is negatively affected by 
increased environmental regulation.  This effect is statistically significant and the 
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elasticity of the inventory response ranges between –0.4 in eastern counties to –0.78 in 
western counties.  The authors also conclude that escalating regulatory stringency was 
not an “overwhelming barrier to retention or attraction of hogs.”  Roe, et al. find that hog 
sector specific and livestock industry infrastructure are important production location 
variables across all counties.  They suggest that property tax rates and environmental 
regulations are local policy instruments that are effective in altering the location of hog 
facilities in the counties of the western states examined.15  In the counties of the eastern 
states examined, urban encroachment and total population have a negative impact on the 
location of hog production.16   
 Park, et al. (2002) examine the relationship between environmental policy and 
industry location in the US livestock industry.  Specifically, they attempt to determine 
whether the livestock environmental regulations constitute proactive or reactive public 
policy.  Proactive public policy is implemented in anticipation of social costs, whereas 
reactive public policy arises due to consumption and production externalities.  The 
analysis involves examination at the state level (including 48 states) of the location of 
livestock inventory, dependent on environmental regulations, natural endowments, 
economic factors, and business climate.  
 Park, et al. develop an index of environmental stringency based on the ACPNTF 
survey results.  Variables representing monitoring and enforcement of regulations, 
legislation restricting corporate ownership of livestock, the tendency to fine operations 
for noncompliance, and the number of staff regulating compliance are constructed from 
the ACPNTF survey.  The econometric model finds that the written regulations have a 
                                                 
15 Western counties from the states of Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Utah. 
16 Eastern counties from the states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Minnesota, and Iowa. 
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positive impact on livestock inventory, as do corporation and zoning restrictions.  Staff 
levels and the willingness to fine noncompliant operations have a negative impact on 
livestock inventory.  The positive relationship between environmental regulation and 
livestock inventory is interpreted as support for the ‘industry drives policy’ hypothesis.  
The authors conclude that the negative sign on the tendency to fine noncompliant 
operations indicates that the written stringency of regulations is less important than the 
willingness to enforce regulations.   
 Herath, et al. (2003) examine the relationship between environmental regulations 
and the spatial dynamics of the US livestock sector.  The authors examine three sectors of 
the US livestock separately, hogs, dairy, and beef cattle.  The environmental regulatory 
stringency measure is expanded to include 48 states for the years 1975 to 2000.  This 
study seeks to examine the pollution haven hypothesis and the possibility of a race to the 
bottom in terms of state environmental regulations in US livestock industry.   
 Annual growth rates in livestock inventories are used as aggregate measures of 
spatial production.  Independent variables include regulatory stringency, relative prices, 
general business climate, livestock infrastructure, and climatic factors.  Regulatory 
stringency is measured based on a number of sources including the Conservation 
Foundation Index (1984), the Renew America Index (1987/1989), the Green Index 
(1991/1992), and Metcalfe’s index as described earlier.  The authors adjust the index as 
calculated by Metcalfe and extend it to include 2000 data.  Indices are normalized by 
dividing through by the mean of each index, providing comparable values over time.  The 
validity of this approach is questionable, however, as the Conservation Foundation Index, 
the Renew America Index, and the Green Index do not specifically apply to agriculture.  
Control variables include output prices, input prices such as corn, farm labour, and 
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electricity, farmland values, and property taxes.  Market access and agglomeration 
economies are considered as livestock infrastructure support.  Average annual 
precipitation and temperature are used to capture differences in the physical features of 
regions.   
 Relative regulatory stringency is found to be positively related to changes in hog 
and dairy inventories, and negatively related to changes in fed-cattle inventories.  These 
results are significant at least at the 10% level.  In the hog and dairy sectors, the authors 
describe these results as counter to the pollution haven hypothesis and conclude that 
inventory level increases first, followed by increases in regulation.  The authors find 
evidence to support the pollution haven hypothesis in the beef sector and provide an 
intuitive explanation for the different results among livestock types.  Production increases 
in the hog and dairy sectors have occurred in non-traditional regions where 
environmental regulations have followed the establishment of significant livestock 
inventories.  Increases in fed cattle production have occurred primarily in the traditional 
non-populated regions, so expansion may have been influenced by environmental 
regulations.  The authors conclude that relative prices and business climate are the 
primary drivers of location choice.   
 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of the political economy literature pertaining 
to trade protection and environmental policy.  This literature provides the basis for the 
theoretical model developed in the next chapter.  While not reviewed in this study, tests 
of the G-H model of trade protection (see Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), 
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Goldberg and Maggi (1999)) have verified the G-H model empirically.  Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay note that the G-H predictions emerge from a fully specified model, 
making them superior to traditional models whose predictions are open to interpretation.   
 Variations of the theoretical model of environmental policy determination of 
Fredriksson (1997) have been empirically tested in a number of recent studies.  Common 
among these empirical tests is the focus on the role of corruption in environmental policy 
formation.  In all cases, corruption is found to reduce the stringency of environmental 
regulations, whether the analysis is at the US state level or is comprised of a cross section 
of countries.   
 This chapter reviews a number of industry location studies that are often cited in 
the literature.  Typically, empirical examinations of the relationship between industry 
location and the stringency of environmental regulations have yielded contradictory 
results.  Some studies, such as McConnell and Schwab (1990), find that regulations have 
no impact on the location decisions of firms because other factors are more important.  
The Henderson (1996) and List and Co (2000) studies find that industry location 
decisions are negatively affected by environmental regulatory stringency.  This chapter 
provided a brief summary of the literature dealing with environmental regulations and 
industry location, providing a more detailed examination of similar studies dealing 
specifically with the US intensive livestock industry. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter will present a theoretical model of the determination of intensive 
livestock environmental regulations.  The economic theory follows adaptations of the G-
H model to environmental policy as developed by Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998), and 
Schleich (1999).  The style of presentation used in this chapter follows the style 
developed by Fredriksson (1997).  The chapter begins with a detailed exposition of the 
theoretical model followed by an outline of three predictions as derived from the 
theoretical model.  These predictions will form the basis of the a priori expectations 
when the theoretical model is tested empirically.   
 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
Following Fredriksson (1997), this theoretical framework models an economy 
comprised of the ILO sector, workers with and without environmental concerns related to 
ILO production, and an incumbent government.  The incumbent government maximizes 
an objective function consisting of the aggregate social welfare of society and the profits 
of the ILO sector.   
The economy is divided into two sectors, one producing a non-polluting 
numeraire good and the ILO sector producing locally polluting non-numeraire good c x .  
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The population is divided into three groups, the ILO sector (denoted I ), workers with 
environmental concerns ( R ), and workers without environmental concerns (U ).TP17 PT  All 
individuals have labour income ( l ) and population is normalized to one.  In addition to 
labour income, workers with environmental concerns are assumed to derive disutility 
from the local pollution that may be caused by ILO production.  
The ILO sector is able to organize and has an incentive to lobby the government 
for weaker environmental regulations.  As a part of its lobbying effort, the ILO sector 
makes campaign contributions to the incumbent government.  The incumbent 
government values campaign contributions because campaign spending is positively 
related to the probability of being re-elected.  The interests of the rest of the workers are 
too diverse to organize a lobby to counter the lobbying efforts of the ILO sector.  Of 
particular importance, the group of workers with environmental concerns is unable to 
form a lobby that can effectively counteract the political power of the ILO sector.  The 
environmentalists are assumed to either suffer from free-riding problems or to have 
insufficient resources to offer campaign contributions to the government.      
 
3.1.1 Consumption 
The utility of workers without environmental concerns is represented by the 
function, 
)(xucUU += ,          (3.1) 
and workers with environmental concerns have the following utility function, 
 θXxucU R −+= )( ,        (3.2)  
                                                 
TP
17
PT ILO pollution is assumed to be primarily a local problem.  In this case, rural citizens are those most affected by ILO 
pollution, and workers with environmental concerns are denoted R (for rural). 
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where c  represents consumption of the numeraire good and ( )xu  is the utility derived 
from consumption of good x .  The total quantity of the polluting non-numeraire good 
produced is X  and θ  represents the per-unit damages as incurred by individuals suffering 
disutility from ILO production.  The fraction of the population with environmental 
concerns is denoted Rα .  Aggregate disutility from pollution is the sum of all individuals 
disutility from pollution, θα XR .TP18 PT   
The per-unit damages are a function of the assimilative capacity of the 
environment, denoted γ .  The assimilative capacity of the environment represents a 
threshold: when there is surplus assimilative capacity, 0=γ  and when the assimilative 
capacity has been surpassed, 1=γ .  If the assimilative capacity of the environment has 
not been reached, per-unit damages take the value of zero.  Once the assimilative capacity 
has been surpassed the damage coefficient is positive.   
 
3.1.2 Production 
Good c  is produced using constant returns to scale (CRS) technology and an 
input-output coefficient equal to one.  The wage rate is equal to one.  Production of good 
x  requires capital, labour, and land; the technology exhibits CRS.  ILO operators receive 
a net price equal to, 
θrpp −= * ,         (3.3)  
where *p  represents market price and 0≥r   is the stringency of environmental 
regulation.  Profits are a quadratic function of net price, 
                                                 
TP
18
PT Population is normalized to one, 10 ≤≤ Rα  
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( ) hpgpp −= 221π          (3.4) 
where g and h are parameters. 
Using Hotelling’s Lemma, the supply function is: 
( ) hgppX −= .          (3.5) 
The derivative of supply with respect to price (inverse of marginal cost) is g , denoted as 
pX  hereafter.   
 
3.1.3 Environmental Regulation 
In the absence of environmental regulation, 0=r  and the ILO sector produces at 
private marginal cost.  Profits are assumed to decrease as r  increases.  The compliance 
costs due to environmental regulation can also be thought of as a form of revenue for 
those providing the ‘services’ associated with the regulation.TP19 PT  The economic 
revenue/cost of the environmental regulation is expressed as follows:  
θθω rhgprpXr )()()( −==        (3.6)  
The regulation is analogous to a pollution tax, but in the case of the regulation, the 
government is not involved in the actual transfer.TP20 PT   Distribution of the transfer is 
assumed to be equal among all individuals. 
 
                                                 
TP
19
PT The following are examples of the ‘services’ associated with environmental regulations.  NMP requirements provide 
expanded markets for firms that conduct soil samples.  Set back restrictions may require the producer to purchase more 
land, therefore bidding up the price of land.  Restricting manure nutrient applications may require that manure be 
shipped greater distances prior to field application, therefore providing revenue to firms involved in the transport of 
manure. 
TP
20
PT In the case of a tax, equation (3.6) describes the tax revenue to society and the tax costs to the producers of X.   
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3.1.4 Welfare Functions 
The ILO sector is assumed able to organize.  As in Damania, et al. (2003), the 
number of individuals in the ILO sector is sufficiently small that its utility function is 
given as,TP 21 PT  
( ) ( )prV I π=           (3.7) 
Gross aggregate social welfare is defined as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )θαωπ pXlrprW RA −++=       (3.8)  
The government utility function is a weighted sum of political contributions from the ILO 
lobby and aggregate social welfare:  
( ) ( )rWrV AG λ+Β=         (3.9)  
where ( )rΒ  represents campaign contributions from the ILO sector and 0≥λ  is the 
perceived exogenous weight the government attaches to aggregate social welfare.  The 
incumbent governments objective is to improve its re-election chances.  The probability 
of being re-elected is increased by campaign contributions and the aggregate welfare of 
society.  The lower the value of λ  the greater the government’s willingness to sell 
policies to the ILO sector in return for campaign contributions.    
  
3.1.5 The Political Equilibrium 
This is a two-stage game between an incumbent local government and the ILO 
sector.  In stage one the ILO sector offers the incumbent government a contribution 
schedule based on the range of policies that may be implemented by the government.  In 
                                                 
TP
21
PT The consumer surplus and revenue due to compliance costs attributable to the ILO lobby are minor compared to the 
economy as a whole.  As is revealed later, this assumption eliminates the impact of the size of the ILO lobby (the 
percent of the total population represented by the ILO lobby) on the equilibrium regulatory stringency.     
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the second stage, the incumbent government maximizes its utility considering the 
campaign contribution offers from the lobby and the aggregate welfare of society.  This 
model involves a bargaining game between a single lobby and the incumbent 
government, whereas the Fredriksson (1997) model derived the bargaining outcome 
between the government and two competing lobbies.   
Based on Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Proposition 1 of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) presents four necessary conditions for a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium.  Following the Grossman and Helpman presentation, Fredriksson 
(1997) presents the necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium pollution tax (T is the 
government’s choice set) in the presence of two or more lobby groups ( L is the set of all 
lobby groups) as follows (p. 49): 
Proposition 1. { }( )*,* tLii ∈Β  is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium iff 
(i)  ( )ti *Β is feasible for all Li ∈ ;  
(ii)  *t maximizes ( ) ( )tWt AiLi λ+Β∑ ∈ * on T ; 
(iii) *t maximizes ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]tWtttV AiLijj λ+Β+Β− ∑ ∈ **  on T for every Lj ∈ ; 
(iv) for every Lj ∈ there exists a Tt j ∈−  that maximizes ( ) ( )∑ ∈ +ΒLi Ai tWt λ*  on 
T such that ( ) 0* =Β − jj t . 
 
Fredriksson provides the following intuition regarding the necessary conditions 
for the Nash equilibrium pollution tax.  Condition (i) requires that the contribution 
schedule of each lobby group is feasible, implying contributions are non-negative and are 
not greater than the aggregate income of the lobby group members.  Condition (ii) 
requires that the government maximize its own welfare as defined by its objective 
function, which is the sum of campaign contributions and weighted aggregate social 
welfare.   
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Condition (iii) states that the equilibrium pollution tax maximizes the joint 
welfare of each lobby group and the welfare of the incumbent government, given the 
other lobby group’s equilibrium contribution schedule.  If this is not the case, then lobby 
group j  could alter its contributions to stimulate a favourable change in government 
policy.  Since the contributions of the other lobby groups are given, lobby group j  would 
capture the surplus resulting from the favourable change in government policy.  
Therefore, if lobby group j  can benefit from a new contribution schedule, the original 
pollution tax could not have represented an equilibrium. 
Condition (iv) establishes the base level of net welfare that the lobby group j uses 
as its anchor level.  The anchor level is the point where the least favourable pollution tax 
for lobby group j involves a contribution equal to zero.  Condition (iv) states that “each 
lobby group j increases its net welfare by lowering its contribution schedule until the 
government is indifferent between *t and some other policy jt −  that gives lobby group 
j a lower net welfare level” (Fredriksson, 1997, p. 50).  Lobby group j does not want the 
government to substitute jt − for *t so the contribution it offers is at the point where the 
government is at least indifferent between the two policies. 
The model developed for this theoretical framework involves a single lobby and 
the incumbent government.  The presence of a single lobby implies that the subscript 
i can be dropped and condition (iv) does not involve competition between lobby groups.  
The four necessary conditions for regulatory stringency in the presence of a single lobby 
group are written as follows:   
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Proposition 1: { }( )*,* rΒ  is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium iff 
(i)  ( )r*Β is feasible; 
(ii)  *r maximizes ( ) ( )rWr Aλ+Β* on R ; 
(iii) *r maximizes ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]rWrrrV AI λ+Β+Β− **  on R ; 
(iv) there exists a Rr I ∈−  that maximizes ( ) ( )rWr Aλ+Β *  on R such that ( ) 0* =Β − Ir . 
 
 Condition (i) states that the contribution offered by the ILO lobby is non-
negative and not greater than the total income of the ILO sector.  Condition (ii) states that 
the government maximizes its own welfare: the sum of campaign contributions from the 
ILO sector and the aggregate welfare of society.  Condition (iii) states that the joint 
welfare of the ILO sector and the government is maximized.  Condition (iv) establishes 
that the ILO sector offers a contribution schedule that leaves the government indifferent 
between *r and Ir − .   
The equilibrium in this model is solved by backwards induction.  In the second 
stage of the game, the government sets regulatory stringency according to the schedule of 
campaign contributions offered by the ILO sector lobby.  According to condition (ii), the 
government maximizes its utility by choosing the regulatory stringency along its 
indifference curve that corresponds to the campaign contributions offered by the ILO 
sector.  In the first stage, based on its indifference curve, the ILO sector chooses the set of 
campaign contributions it is willing to offer the government.  This is a full information 
model, implying that the ILO sector knows the policy choices of the incumbent 
government given any set of campaign contribution offers.  Following condition (iii), the 
equilibrium regulatory stringency chosen by the government maximizes the joint welfare 
of the government and the ILO sector.  Condition (iv) requires that there be a level of 
regulatory stringency that the government may implement for which the ILO sector is 
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willing to make zero campaign contributions.  The government is indifferent between this 
regulatory stringency and the equilibrium regulatory stringency.  In the absence of the 
ILO sector lobby efforts, the government would implement the socially optimal 
regulatory stringency.  In the presence of the single ILO sector lobby group, the 
government is indifferent between the equilibrium regulatory stringency and the socially 
optimal regulatory stringency.  In this case, the socially optimal regulatory stringency 
corresponds with 1−r  as referred to in condition (iv) in Proposition 1 above.   
In order to avoid implementation of the socially optimal regulation, the ILO 
sector increases its contribution level from zero to the point where the government is 
indifferent between the socially optimal regulatory stringency and the equilibrium 
stringency.  This offer “is proportional to the excess burden that the equilibrium 
(environmental) policy impose(s) on society.  The factor of proportionality is the weight 
that the government attaches to aggregate gross welfare (relative to campaign 
contributions) in its own objective function” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p. 846).  
This implies that the ILO sector captures the entire surplus from the bargaining process 
between itself and the incumbent government.  In the political equilibrium, less than 
optimal environmental quality is provided, implying that aggregate social welfare has 
decreased.   
    
3.1.6 The Equilibrium Characterization 
From Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994), and 
following Damania, et al. (2003) the Nash equilibrium is achieved when necessary 
conditions (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 are met: 
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 ( ) ( )rWrr A
t
λ+Β= *maxarg*  on R  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]rWrrrVr AI
t
λ+Β+Β−= **maxarg*  on R  
 
Taking the first order conditions of the above two necessary conditions yields the 
following: 
( ) ( ) 0** =∂
∂+∂
Β∂
r
rW
r
r Aλ          (3.10) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0**** =∂
∂+∂
Β∂+∂
Β∂−∂
∂
r
rW
r
r
r
r
r
rV AI λ      (3.11) 
By substitution of equation (3.10) into equation (3.11), 
( ) ( )
r
r
r
rV I
∂
Β∂=∂
∂ **
         (3.12) 
This implies that the ILO sector makes marginal campaign contribution offers for small 
changes in regulatory stringency according to the impact the regulatory stringency 
change will have on the ILO sectors welfare.  This corresponds with the equality between 
the contribution schedule and the ILO sector indifference curve in Figure 3.1. 
Further substitution of (3.12) into (3.10) reveals the equilibrium characterization: 
( ) ( ) 0** =∂
∂+∂
∂
r
rW
r
rV AI λ         (3.13) 
Following Damania, et al. (2003), the following expansion of the equilibrium 
characterization presented in (3.13) reveals that the government trades off the 
profitability of the ILO sector and aggregate social welfare at a rate of λ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −++∂∂−=∂∂ θαωπλπ pXlrprrp R     (3.14) 
Examination of (3.14) reveals that for any increase in ILO sector profitability (due to 
changes in regulatory stringency) the decrease in social welfare due to total pollution 
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must be greater than the increase in ILO sector profitability.  In the context of ILO policy, 
the pressure for increased rural economic development determines the rate of tradeoff 
exogenously.TP22 PT  When the incumbent government is under greater pressure to generate 
rural economic development, the weight the government places on aggregate social 
welfare decreases because of the perception among the electorate that the ILO sector can 
provide rural employment and increase investment in the rural economy.  Governments 
that are under relatively greater pressure to generate rural economic development are 
more susceptible to campaign contributions from the ILO sector because they place less 
weight on aggregate social welfare.   
   
 3.1.7 Equilibrium Regulatory Stringency 
The equilibrium characterization presented in (3.13) is the sum of the partial 
derivative of ILO sector utility with respect to regulatory stringency and the partial 
derivative of the aggregate welfare of society with respect to regulatory stringency 
weighted by the pressure for rural economic development.  The equilibrium 
characterization is alternatively written as:TP23 PT 
0=+ ArIr WV λ .         (3.15) 
The partial derivatives of these two welfare functions are calculated based on (3.3) 
through (3.6) and (3.7) and (3.8).  The partial derivatives for ILO sector utility and 
aggregate social welfare are as follows: 
( )θpXV Ir −=           (3.16) 
                                                 
TP
22
PT The rate of tradeoff is equivalent to the exogenous weight the government places on aggregate social welfare. 
TP
23
PT Subscripts denote first order derivatives with respect to r. 
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[ ]rXW RpAr −= αθ 2          (3.17) 
The equilibrium solution is interpreted through the following assumption and 
three propositions.  The assumption ensures that the equilibrium characterization is 
maximized.  The three propositions examine the equilibrium solution under alternative 
circumstances. 
 
Assumption 1: The weight the government places on aggregate social 
welfare is greater than one ( 1>λ ).   
 
Proof: Maximization of the equilibrium characterization requires the following second 
order condition to hold: 
( ) ( ) 0
2
2
2
2
<∂
∂+∂
∂
r
W
r
V AI λ          (3.18) 
Solving for the second order condition yields the following result: 
( ) 1022 >⇒<−+ λθλθ pp XX         (3.19) 
This implies that maximization of the equilibrium characterization requires that the 
weight the incumbent government places on aggregate social welfare is greater than unity 
( 1>λ ).TP24 PT     
 
Proposition 2:  In the absence of the ILO sector lobby, the equilibrium 
regulatory stringency is equal to the marginal disutility from total pollution 
(the proportion of the population that suffers disutility from ILO pollution).TP25 PT    
 
Proof: Setting (3.17) equal to zero and solving for r  yields the following: 
                                                 
TP
24
PT An interior solution is assumed.  If 1<λ , ILO sector profitability receives more weight than aggregate social 
welfare in the government’s objective function, implying a corner solution. 
TP
25
PT From the aggregate social welfare function, R
A
X
W αθ −=∂
∂
.  This corresponds to the tangency between the 
governments indifference curve and the horizontal axis (which implies zero campaign contributions from the ILO 
sector) in Figure 3.1.   
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RA
r rW α=⇒= 0          (3.20) 
Proposition 3: In the presence of an ILO sector lobby, the political 
equilibrium regulatory stringency is less than the socially optimal regulatory 
stringency. 
 
Proof: In the presence of the ILO sector lobby, the incumbent government maximizes the 
equilibrium characterization presented in (3.15).  Substituting (3.16) and (3.17) into 
(3.15) and solving for r  reveals the political equilibrium regulatory stringency:  
0=+ ArIr WV λ  
( ) ( ) 02 =−+− rXpX Rp αθλθ        (3.21) 
θλ
θαλ
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r
−=  
θλα p
R
X
Xr −=          (3.22) 
Since Assumption 1 states that ∞<< λ1 and X , pX , and θ  are unambiguously 
positive, the second term in the RHS of (3.22) must be positive.  This implies that Rr α<  
in the political equilibrium.   
 
Proposition 4: If the assimilative capacity of the environment has not been 
reached, the political equilibrium regulatory stringency is zero.  
 
Proof: As stated earlier, if the assimilative capacity of the environment has not been 
reached, 0=γ which implies the damage coefficient equals zero.  Further analysis of the 
equilibrium regulatory stringency reveals that 0=r  when 0=θ  since ∞→− θλ pX
X
.  This 
implies that in the absence of pollution damages, the political equilibrium regulatory 
stringency is zero.   
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Graphical representation of the equilibrium is presented in Figure 3.2 below.  The 
vertical axis represents price (P) while the horizontal axis represents the supply of 
intensive livestock (X(p)).  Intensive livestock market price is denoted *p .  Private 
marginal costs (PMC) correspond with the supply function ignoring the costs due to 
regulation.  The social marginal cost (SMC) curve is the vertical summation of private 
marginal costs and the marginal externality cost due to pollution resulting from intensive 
livestock production.  The marginal externality cost is zero at all points to the left of 
0=γ  and equals Rθα  at all production levels to the right of 0=γ .   
If the government chooses not to regulate the ILO industry, production 
corresponds to 0=r  (the intersection of *p  and PMC) and the deadweight loss is area 
abc.  The optimal regulatory stringency as described in Proposition 2 corresponds with 
production at Rr α=  as shown in Figure 3.2.  At this point, the regulatory compliance 
costs imposed on the ILO industry force full internalization of the marginal externality 
costs, thereby eliminating the deadweight loss.  As stated in Proposition 3, the political 
equilibrium regulatory stringency lies somewhere between the production levels 
corresponding with 0=r  and Rr α= .  According to Proposition 4, if the intensive 
livestock market price is less than or equal to 1p as shown in Figure 3.2, then the political 
equilibrium regulatory stringency is zero.  
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Figure 3.2: Market equilibrium 
 
3.2 Comparative Static Analysis 
A comparative static analysis of the regulatory stringency equation provides a 
number of predictions regarding the relationship between regulatory stringency and key 
exogenous variables in the model.  The comparative static analysis will examine the 
response of regulatory stringency to the variables λ , Rα , and θ .  The predictions 
derived from this comparative static analysis will form the basis of the testable 
hypotheses in the empirical component of this thesis. 
In order to perform comparative static analysis of regulatory stringency, the 
equation explaining regulatory stringency should be derived as follows.TP26 PT  Substituting 
(3.3) and (3.5) into (3.21) yields the following: 
( ) ( ) 0* 2 =−+−−− rXhgrgp Rp αθλθθ        (3.23) 
                                                 
TP
26
PT This presentation of regulatory stringency simplifies the interpretation of the results of the comparative static 
analysis. 
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Rearranging (3.23) and solving for r results in the following equation for the political 
equilibrium regulatory stringency: 
( ) ( ) Rpp XhgprX θαλλθ −−=− *1  
( )
( )λθ
λαθ
−
−+=
1p
R
p
X
rXX
r          (3.24) 
Notice that, according to Assumption 1, the denominator in (3.24) is strictly 
negative.  Since 0≥r , this further implies that the numerator is negative or equal to zero, 
and as a consequence Rλα  must be greater than or equal to r .   
 
Prediction 1:  The relationship between regulatory stringency and the weight 
the government places on aggregate social welfare is unambiguously 
positive.   
 
Proof: Total differentiation of (3.24) with respect to λ yields:TP27 PT 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ]21
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>−
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λ
Rr
d
dr          (3.25) 
Since 1>λ , the denominator of (3.25) is strictly negative.  According to Proposition 3, in 
the presence of the ILO sector lobby, r is less than Rα , implying that the numerator is 
also negative.  The change in r  with respect to λ is therefore unambiguously positive.   
 
Prediction 2:  The relationship between regulatory stringency and the 
marginal disutility from total pollution is unambiguously positive.   
 
                                                 
TP
27
PT The quotient rule is used for all total differentiations performed in this section. 
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Proof: Total differentiation of (3.24) with respect to Rα  yields the following result:  
( )
( )[ ]21
1
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α p
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d
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−
−−=  
( ) 011 >−=−
−= λ
λ
λ
λ
α Rd
dr        (3.26) 
Both the numerator and denominator are the same sign,TP PTimplying that the change in 
regulatory stringency with respect to Rα  is unambiguously positive.TP28 PT  In the political 
equilibrium, marginal changes in regulatory stringency according to small changes in the 
disutility from pollution are set according to the weight the government places on 
aggregate social welfare.  If the incumbent government maximizes aggregate social 
welfare ( ∞→λ ), then a given change in the marginal disutility from pollution results in 
an equivalent change in regulatory stringency.   
 
Prediction 3:  The relationship between regulatory stringency and per-unit 
pollution damages is unambiguously positive.   
 
Proof: Total differentiation of (3.24) with respect to θ  yields: 
X
r
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d
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The first term in the RHS of (3.27) represents the direct effect of a change in the damage 
coefficient on regulatory stringency.  Due to Proposition 3 and Assumption 1, the first 
                                                 
TP
28
PT Recall that maximization of the equilibrium characterization requires that 1>λ .  
term is unambiguously positive.  The second term in the RHS of (3.27) represents the 
indirect effect of the damage coefficient acting through intensive livestock supply.  As 
stated in equations (3.3) and (3.5), the damage coefficient has a negative impact on 
intensive livestock supply.  Similarly, according to equation (3.24) the relationship 
between intensive livestock supply and regulatory stringency is negative.  The indirect 
relationship between the damage coefficient and regulatory stringency is therefore 
unambiguously positive.   
The direct effect of the damage coefficient on regulatory stringency captures the 
impact of pollution damages on aggregate social welfare.  Holding all else constant, an 
increase in pollution damages reduces aggregate social welfare, giving the government an 
incentive to increase regulatory stringency.  The indirect effect of the damage coefficient 
is due to changes in output that result from a change in the pollution intensity of intensive 
livestock production.  All else equal, an increase in the pollution intensity of intensive 
livestock production increases compliance costs and results in lower production levels.  
Lower production levels correspond with lower aggregate ILO sector profits.  In the 
political equilibrium, the government is trading ILO sector profitability in exchange for 
aggregate social welfare.  Since ILO sector profitability decreases with an increase in the 
damage coefficient, the government has an incentive to increase regulatory stringency.      
 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
The theoretical model presented in this chapter will provide the framework for the 
empirical analysis component of this thesis.  A general equilibrium model was presented, 
allowing for interaction among a regional incumbent government, the ILO sector, and 
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rural citizens.  The incumbent government determines the stringency of environmental 
regulations.  When setting environmental policy, the government maximizes its objective 
function, which consists of campaign contributions from the ILO sector and aggregate 
social welfare.  The weight the incumbent government places on aggregate social welfare 
is determined by the perceived political trade-off between environmental quality and 
rural economic development.  The weight therefore increases as the pressure to pursue 
rural economic development decreases.  Comparative static analysis indicated that the 
relationship between the weight the government places on aggregate social welfare and 
regulatory stringency is positive.   
While the trade-off between environmental quality and rural economic 
development is of primary interest in this thesis, the theoretical model finds that a number 
of other factors will impact the formation of ILO environmental policy.  The marginal 
disutility from pollution has a positive relationship with regulatory stringency. 
Essentially, this variable controls for the political power of individuals with 
environmental concerns, assumed to be rural citizens in this case.  Per-unit pollution 
damages control for the vulnerability of regional environments to water contamination by 
manure nutrients.  If the pollution damage intensity of ILO production is high, then the 
government has an incentive to increase the stringency of regulations.   
The predictions outlined in the last section of this chapter form the testable 
hypotheses of the empirical research component of this thesis.  The following chapter 
presents the methods and procedures used to test these hypotheses.  Specification of the 
econometric model is presented along with a detailed discussion of the data utilized in 
this analysis.     
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
METHODS AND 
PROCEDURES 
 
This chapter will set out the methods and procedures used to conduct the 
empirical analysis of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3.  This chapter begins 
with a general outline of the econometric specification, based on the theoretical 
framework and past research into the spatial pattern of livestock production in the US.  
The second section provides a discussion of the data requirements.  The final section 
begins with the econometric specification of the preferred model, followed by a number 
of alternative econometric specifications that are used to substantiate the results of the 
preferred model.   
 
4.1 Empirical Model 
The primary purpose of the empirical analysis conducted in this thesis is to test 
the predictions derived from the theoretical model presented in the preceding chapter.  As 
derived in the theoretical model, state regulatory stringency is explained by the marginal 
disutility from pollution, the extent of pollution damages, and the pressure on the 
incumbent government to pursue rural economic development initiatives.  As has been 
recognized in past studies of the US intensive livestock industry (Park, et al., 2002) and 
the US hog industry (Metcalfe, 2001), intensive livestock production is potentially 
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endogenously determined with regulatory stringency.  The potential endogeneity between 
intensive livestock production and regulatory stringency requires that an equation 
explaining intensive livestock inventory be specified.  The econometric model of 
intensive livestock inventory used in this study follows the work of Metcalf (2001), Park, 
et al. (2002), Roe, et al. (2002), and Herath, et al. (2003).  Following the notation used in 
the theoretical model, the regulatory stringency and the intensive livestock inventory 
functions are specified as follows:  
( )λθα ,,, RXfr =   
 ( )pXrfX ,= . 
Proxies are used for a number of the variables in this analysis, requiring the use of a 
number of different econometric specifications.  The following section provides a 
detailed discussion of the data requirements.   
 
4.2 Data Requirements 
Secondary data was collected from a variety of sources in order to estimate the 
econometric model.  Where possible, data for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 was 
gathered.  As in (Eliste and Fredriksson, 2001), three-year data was averaged in order to 
smooth out the impacts of economic cycles.  Also, following Metcalfe (2001), intensive 
livestock producers are assumed to be forward looking so intensive livestock inventory 
decisions in 1995, 1996, and 1997 are a function of expected regulations in 1997.  
Similarly, the determination of government policy is partly based on the past history of 
the industry, so inventory levels in 1995, 1996, and 1997 are relevant to the analysis.  
Table 4.1 provides variable abbreviations, a brief description of the data collected, and 
the source of the data.  Table 4.3, presented at the conclusion of this section, provides 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis.   
 
 
Table 4.1: Description of Variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
STRING ILO environmental regulatory 
stringency index (0,1,…,19)   
1998 National Survey of Animal Confinement Policies 
(NSACP) – Questions 7 - 25 
http://cherokee.agecon.clemson.edu/confine.htm
SETBACK Setback regulation (1=yes) 1998 NSACP – Question 7 
NUTSTDS Nutrient standards (1=yes) 1998 NSACP– Question 15 
RANKSTDS Nut. Std. (0=no std, 1=N, 
2=N+P) 
1998 NSACP– Question 15 
AU1997a Hog, beef, dairy, poultry animal 
units (1997 AU) 
Manure Nutrients Relative to the Capacity of Cropland and 
Pastureland to Assimilate Nutrients: Spatial and Temporal 
Trends for the United States 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/pubs/manntr.html            
PERCENTRURALa Non-metropolitan share of total 
population (%)  
BEA. Regional Economic Accounts – CA1-3 Population 
http://www.BEA.gov/bea/regional/reis/
DENSITYa Non-metropolitan 
population/Total rural land 
(number of persons/1,000 acres) 
BEA. Regional Economic Accounts – CA1-3 Population 
http://www.BEA.gov/bea/regional/reis/
NRCS, USDA. Summary Report, 1997 NRI.  
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/NRI/1997/summary_report/
table2.html
ENVFACTORS Index of environmental factors 
indicating potential vulnerability 
of watersheds (1,2,…,9) 
NRCS, USDA. Potential Priority Watersheds for Protection of 
Water Quality from Contamination by Manure Nutrients 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/pubs/wshedpap_w.htm
l (Maps 6-8) 
RESNCHANGE Change in residual nitrogen 
between 1992 and 1997 (%) 
Manure Nutrients Relative to the Capacity of Cropland and 
Pastureland to Assimilate Nutrients: Spatial and Temporal 
Trends for the United States 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/pubs/manntr.html  
NATAMENITY Natural amenity rank (1,2,…,7)   ERS, USDA. Natural Amenities Drive Rural Population 
Change.  http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/NaturalAmenities/
DEMOCRAT Popular vote cast for US 
president – Democratic (%) 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/97statab/election.pdf
PCI(year) Percent change in non-
metropolitan per capita income 
(%) 
BEA. Regional Economic Accounts – CA1-3 Per capita 
personal income 
http://www.BEA.gov/bea/regional/reis/
TOTPOPa Total state population (number 
of persons) 
BEA. Regional Economic Accounts – SA1-3 Population 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/
CORNPRICEa Corn Price ($/bu) USDA – NASS Agricultural Prices—Annual 
http://jan.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/price/zap-bb/
LANDVALUEa Value of farm real estate ($/acre) ERS, USDA.  Agricultural Resources and Environmental 
Indicators: Farm Real Estate Values, Rents, and Taxes 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/arei/ah722/arei1_2/arei1_
2farmrealestatevalues.pdf
MFGWAGEa Average manufacturing wage 
($/hr) 
U.S Dept. of Comm. U.S. Census Bureau. General Summary 
1997 Economic Census Manufacturing Subject Series  
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/97m31s-gs.pdf
PROPTAXb Taxes levied on agricultural real 
estate (Taxes per $100 of full 
market value) 
ERS, USDA.  Agricultural Resources and Environmental 
Indicators: Farm Real Estate Values, Rents, and Taxes 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/arei/ah722/arei1_2/arei1_
2farmrealestatevalues.pdf
Note: all variables are at the state level  
a Three-year average (1995, 1996, 1997) 
b Three-year average (1993, 1994, 1995)  
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4.2.1 Regulatory Stringency 
4.2.1.1 Examples from a Review of the Literature 
The stringency of intensive livestock environmental regulations has been used as 
an independent variable in a number of ILO industry location decision studies (Metcalfe 
(2001), Park, et al. (2002), Roe, et al. (2002), Herath, et al. (2003), and Isik (2003)).  
Metcalfe (2001) ranks the stringency of ILO regulations both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  The quantitative variable uses regional spending on water quality programs 
as a measure of stringency.  This measurement may account for the attitude of the state 
towards water quality protection, but it does not reflect the compliance costs borne by the 
ILO sector.29  As an alternative to the quantitative measure, Metcalfe derives qualitative 
stringency measures for the years 1994 and 1998 based on an examination of the extent 
of state manure management regulations.  The 1994 measure is based on research 
conducted by Copeland (1994) and the 1998 measure is based on the1998 National 
Survey of Animal Confinement Policies (NSACP) (Edelman, et. al., 1999).  The number 
of state regulations imposed on ILOs is summed using a weight based on the relative 
severity of the regulation.  Each state is then rated on a scale between one and three, one 
being low stringency.  The index totals for both years are reported in Metcalfe (2000) and 
were reproduced in Table 1.2 in the introductory chapter of this thesis.       
In their study of the US livestock industry, Park, et al. (2002) use data from the 
1998 NSACP to create a number of measures of regulatory stringency.  The general 
stringency of environmental regulations was measured as an unweighted sum of 
affirmative responses to 29 of the survey questions.  Each of the 48 participating states 
                                                 
29 Metcalfe recognizes that state government water quality spending may reflect the extent of state government 
assistance to the ILO sector.  
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(Louisiana and West Virginia did not participate) received a score ranging between zero 
and nineteen.  Dummies for anti-corporate farming laws and local agricultural zoning 
were also created from the survey.  Park, et al. create variables to represent the 
monitoring and enforcement efforts of the individual states.  Enforcement is seen as a 
better measure of regulatory stringency because enacting environmental legislation is 
only the first step in the regulatory process; monitoring and enforcement are needed to 
ensure the regulations are followed 
In an analysis of the U.S. steel industry, Gray and Deily (1996) examine the link 
between enforcement of air quality regulations and compliance decisions.  Although not 
explicitly tested, Gray and Deily suggest that enforcement may be a function of firms’ 
political power.  Park, et al. generate “imperfect substitute” variables for enforcement 
levels among states using information from the 1998 NSACP.  A dummy variable 
representing whether or not fines can be levied and a count variable for the number of 
staff employed in monitoring roles were constructed.  Park et al. found that the proxies 
for monitoring and enforcement were significant determinants of the location decisions of 
the ILO industry.  Nonetheless, the reliability of the staff enforcement variable is 
questionable as it fails to adjust for both the size of the industry and the size of the 
geographic area being monitored.  Also, two thirds of states did not respond to the 
staffing level question, indicating that they assign zero hours to enforcement.  The proxy 
for enforcement is based on the response to a question regarding the imposition of fines.  
Answers to this question reflect the fines that the regulator is able to impose in the event 
of illegal discharges into streams or waterways.  Answers to this question do not reflect 
whether or not these fines have been imposed.  Similar to the regulatory stringency 
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variable, the enforcement variable measures the written stringency of regulations, rather 
than the actual enforcement of the regulation.      
In his study of the location decision of dairy farms across the U.S., Isik (2003) 
creates a measure of the stringency of environmental regulations using the 1998 NSACP 
using the same methodology as in Park, et al.  This proxy is based on affirmative answers 
to 29 questions relating to regulations from the survey.  Each of the 48 participating states 
(including Alaska and Hawaii) was ranked according to relative regulatory stringency.   
 
4.2.1.2 Regulatory Stringency 
Similar to the studies mentioned in the previous section, the proxy for regulatory 
stringency constructed for this analysis is based on the ACPNTF survey conducted in 
1998.  Since this survey was conducted throughout 1998, the survey is assumed to 
represent regulations as they stood in 1997.  Louisiana and West Virginia did not 
participate in the ACPNTF survey and are therefore not included in the sample used in 
this thesis.  The responses for Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the sample as they 
do not have significant intensive livestock inventories.  New Jersey is excluded since it 
has no non-metropolitan counties.  For the purposes of this study, Alabama is dropped 
from the sample due to the large proportion of blank responses reported in the survey.30  
Alabama did not respond to any of the environmental questions, yet gave an affirmative 
answer to the question regarding cost sharing and incentive programs used to encourage 
compliance.  This contradiction casts doubt on the validity of the Alabama survey.  After 
these exclusions the sample size consists of 44 states.   
                                                 
30 All 19 questions from section two are blank. 
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Following the method used in Park, et al. (2002) and Isik (2003), construction of 
the regulatory stringency index is based on responses to 19 questions related to 
environmental regulation from section two and 9 questions related to industry regulation 
from section three of the 1998 ACPNTF survey.  These questions are presented in 
Appendix A.  As an example, Question 7 from the survey is as follows:  “Are minimum 
set-back distances required by state government for site approval? Describe any required 
set-backs.”  An affirmative answer to this question implies the state has implemented 
setback requirements, thereby increasing the stringency of environmental regulations in 
that state.  Question 15 asks “Does your state government impose nutrient standards or 
other limits which restrict amounts of manure applications, timing of land application, set 
backs for application, irrigation, or other forms of manure disposal from confined 
livestock operations? If "yes", please describe.”  An affirmative answer to this question 
implies that the state government has implemented nutrient management plan (NMP) 
requirements on the intensive livestock sector, which also increases the stringency of 
environmental regulations.  The total number of affirmative answers to the 28 questions 
evaluated generated an index score for each state.  The highest index score recorded was 
in Iowa, which answered a total of 19 of the survey questions affirmatively.  Illinois, 
Maryland, and Oklahoma each received index scores of 18.  Delaware, Massachusetts, 
and New Hampshire received index scores of zero, making them the least stringent of the 
states included in the sample.31  New York answered one question affirmatively, giving 
that state a score of 1.  The regulatory stringency index (STRING) ranges from 0 to 19, 
zero indicating low stringency and 19 indicating high stringency.  The index scores for 
each of the 44 states evaluated in this analysis are presented in Table 4.2 below.  The 
                                                 
31 Based on the number of affirmative answers to the 28 questions, Alabama would also receive a score of zero. 
 69
correlation between the regulatory stringency index developed and reported by Metcalfe 
(2000) (based on 25 states) and the regulatory stringency index calculated for this study 
(based on the same 25 states) is 0.79.  
 
 
Table 4.2: 1997 State Regulatory Stringency Index Scores 
State Index Score State Index Score 
Iowa 19 Tennessee 12 
Illinois 18 New Mexico 11 
Maryland 18 North Dakota 11 
Oklahoma 18 Pennsylvania 11 
Nebraska 17 Utah 11 
South Carolina 17 Wisconsin 11 
South Dakota 17 Montana 10 
Kansas 16 Virginia 10 
Arkansas 15 California 9 
North Carolina 15 Connecticut 9 
Texas 14 Idaho 9 
Florida 13 Indiana 9 
Kentucky 13 Nevada 9 
Mississippi 13 Colorado 6 
Ohio 13 Rhode Island 6 
Vermont 13 Washington 5 
Wyoming 13 Maine 4 
Arizona 12 Michigan 3 
Georgia 12 New York 1 
Minnesota 12 Delaware 0 
Missouri 12 Massachusetts 0 
Oregon 12 New Hampshire 0 
Source: Authors calculations, data retrieved from Edelman, et al. (1999)  
 
4.2.1.3 Alternative Regulatory Stringency Measures 
In addition to the basic measure of regulatory stringency, a number of binary 
variables were constructed based on individual questions from the ACPNTF survey.  
These alternative measures are based on individual regulations that are used in a number 
of the states.  The regulations chosen impose costs on ILO producers and are designed to 
protect the air and water quality of rural citizens.  The first alternative measure was based 
on the presence of setback provisions and was used by Herath, et al. (2003) to 
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differentiate the regulatory stringency across US states.32  The second alternative measure 
was based on the imposition of nutrient management plans (NMPs).  This regulation was 
chosen because it addresses the application of excess manure nutrients, potentially 
causing the greatest concern regarding water quality problems associated with intensive 
livestock production. 
The first variable, from Question 7 of the ACPNTF survey, recognized the 
presence of legislated setback provisions (SETBACK).  Setback restrictions place 
minimum distance requirements on the distance between water sources or human 
dwellings and the application of manure nutrients.  Essentially, these restrictions limit the 
availability of land for intensive livestock production, thereby increasing the stringency 
of ILO environmental regulations.  Setbacks are intended to protect against water 
pollution and to preserve the air quality of rural citizens.  The presence of setback 
legislation (SETBACK=1) increases the stringency of regulations.   
The second variable, from Question 15 of the ACPNTF survey, examined the 
presence of nutrient management plan (NMP) legislation (NUTSTDS).  NMPs place 
restrictions on the timing of application, the method of application, and on the quantity of 
manure nutrients that may be applied to agricultural land.  These restrictions limit 
producer flexibility when disposing of manure nutrients, increasing the compliance costs 
of ILO environmental regulations.  NMPs are imposed in the interest of protecting water 
sources from manure nutrient contamination.  If manure nutrients are applied in excess of 
the assimilative capacity of the agricultural land, the potential for water contamination by 
                                                 
32 The distance of the setback provision, adjusted by the cost of agricultural land, was used in the aggregate measure of 
regulatory stringency for the year 2000.   
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manure nutrients increases.  If a NMP is required (NUTSTDS=1), the compliance costs 
of the producer are expected to increase.   
The third variable, also based on answers to Question 15 of the survey, provides 
an expanded measure of NMP legislation (RANKSTDS).  NMP legislation can be ranked 
according to the stringency of the requirements.  NMPs that restrict applications of both 
nitrogen and phosphorus may be more stringent than regulations that place restrictions on 
nitrogen only.  It follows that NMPs that restrict nitrogen applications are more stringent 
than the absence of a NMP.  This variable was constructed as an ordered rank variable 
taking values of 0, 1, and 2, ranked according to the expected compliance costs of the 
NMP.33  As in the NUTSTDS variable mentioned above, the absence of a NMP resulted 
in a score of 0.  A NMP that restricts applications of nitrogen was given a score of 1 
while NMPs that restricts both nitrogen and phosphorus applications were given a score 
of 2.   
 
4.2.2 Livestock Inventory 
State livestock industry (AU1997) was calculated using the animal unit totals as 
reported in Kellogg, et al. (2000).  Kellogg, et al. adjusted 1997 state livestock 
inventories, as reported in the 1997 Census of Agriculture, by an animal unit conversion 
factor based on the manure nitrogen characteristics of each animal class.  Four animal 
classes are included in this calculation: hogs, beef cattle, dairy cattle, and poultry.  This 
measure provides an estimate of the total livestock inventory in a state in 1997, adjusted 
by the contribution of each species to the quantity of manure produced.  An adjustment 
                                                 
33 The difference between 0 and 1 is not the same as the difference between 1 and 2.  The code 0,1,2 simply indicates 
the ascending rank of regulatory stringency (Greene, 2000, p. 875).  
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for potential manure nutrient production is used in order to control for the aggregate 
production of manure nutrients in a state over the course of a year.  Therefore, the animal 
unit calculations used in this study provide an aggregate indication of the potential stock 
of manure nitrogen but nitrogen flows from previous years are not captured.   
 
4.2.3 Marginal Disutility from ILO Pollution 
4.2.3.1 Percent Rural and Rural Population Density 
Population data was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
Regional Economic Accounts.  The percent of the population that is rural 
(PERCENTRURAL) is the ratio of non-metropolitan population to total population.34   
Rural population density (DENSITY) was defined as the ratio of non-metropolitan 
population to rural land area.  Rural land area data was collected from the Natural 
Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) (1997) and included all cropland, CRP land, 
pasture, rangeland, and forestland. 
The proportion of the population that has environmental concerns impacts the 
stringency of environmental regulations.  In the context of ILO environmental 
regulations, the percent of the population that is considered rural represents those with 
environmental concerns.  All else equal, an increase in the number of rural citizens as a 
percent of the total population gives rural citizens greater political power, and results in 
higher regulatory stringency.  The interaction between rural population density and the 
percent of the population rural is a proxy for the availability of land suitable for ILO 
production.  A region that has a large number of rural citizens who densely populate the 
                                                 
34 Throughout this study, non-metropolitan is equivalent to rural.   
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rural land base is assumed to be less suitable for ILO production.  Conflicts between rural 
citizens and the ILO industry are more likely to arise if open, unpopulated space is 
scarce.  This interaction term therefore provides an additional control for the importance 
of rural citizens with environmental concerns. 
 
4.2.3.2 Natural Amenity   
The Natural Amenity Scale, as developed by the ERS (1999), provides a 
measurement of the attractiveness of a location as a retirement or vacation destination.  
This scale includes measures of warm winter, winter sunlight, temperate summer, low 
summer humidity, topographic variation, and water area, all thought to be attractive 
natural amenities.  The ERS data provides a scale and rank for each county in the lower 
48 states.  State natural amenity ranks (NATAMENITY) were calculated as an average of 
the county ranks for each individual state.  California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Utah were the top ranked states on the natural amenity scale.  At 
the bottom of the list were states such as Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, and North Dakota.  
The natural amenity scale is only a measure of the natural features of the states 
environment.  The impact of human activities on the aesthetic quality of the landscape is 
not considered.  This variable merely captures the initial natural amenities endowment, 
not investments in the natural amenities of an area.   
In the context of intensive livestock environmental regulations, states that are 
relatively more abundant in natural amenities likely have greater incentive to protect 
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environmental quality from intensive livestock pollution.35  This variable was found to 
have a positive relationship with rural county population changes over the past 25 years 
(ERS, 1999).  This variable therefore has two effects: first, it provides a measure of the 
potential for a region to further develop as a retirement or vacation destination and 
second, the natural amenity scale may capture the effect of recent migration on the 
stringency of ILO environmental regulations.36      
 
4.2.4 Pollution Damages 
4.2.4.1 Environmental Factors 
The vulnerability of watersheds to manure nutrients was measured using a set of 
three environmental factors developed by the NRCS (Kellogg, 2002): a percolation 
factor, a runoff factor, and a soil erosion factor.  The percolation factor estimates the 
annual precipitation that percolates through the root zone.  The calculation was based on 
annual precipitation, a weight for precipitation in the non-growing season, and soil 
hydrologic groups.  Hydrologic groups sort soils according to the potential for water 
infiltration.  The run-off factor estimated the annual precipitation that is run-off, 
evaporation and percolation into the soil being the alternatives.  Annual precipitation 
combined with soil hydrologic group, tillage, conservation practice, and land cover 
determine the potential for run-off.  The soil erosion factor estimated the potential for soil 
                                                 
35 The intent of the natural amenity variable is to capture the marginal disutility from pollution.  The inclusion of water 
area in the calculation of this variable also captures the potential for pollution damages from ILO production.  The 
correlation between STRING and NATAMENITY is –0.184.   
36 Recent migrants to an area may not have an interest in the economic well being of the existing intensive livestock 
sector and may lobby for more stringent regulations.  While correlated with population growth, calculation of the 
natural amenity scale controls for the potential for pollution damages from intensive livestock production.  A better 
proxy for the impact of recent migration may be recent population growth.  January temperature and days of sunlight 
may also serve as a proxy for past and future ability to attract retirees and vacationers.   
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to move due to sheet and rill erosion.  Calculations for the soil erosion factor were based 
on the Universal Soil Loss Equation.   
The environmental factors were combined with the residual manure nutrients 
produced in each region analyzed.37  Excess nitrogen and phosphorus nutrients represent 
the difference between the pounds of recoverable manure nutrients produced and the 
assimilative capacity of available cropland and pastureland.  Nitrogen is highly 
dissolvable in water and losses of nitrogen occur primarily due to leaching and run-off.  
Phosphorus is less soluble in water and tends to adsorb to soil particles.  Therefore, the 
percolation and run-off vulnerability factors estimate the potential for manure nitrogen to 
move from agricultural land and the soil erosion vulnerability factor provides an estimate 
of the potential for phosphorus to move from agricultural land.     
Since the data underlying the maps provided by the NRCS was not available, a 
visual inspection of the maps was performed in order to assign a vulnerability rank to 
each state.  Each factor was displayed on a map, with each degree of vulnerability 
represented by a different shade, five shades in total.  Each state was assigned a value 
ranging from 1 to 9, with even values assigned to combinations of adjacent shades.  
Vulnerability increases with an increase in the environmental factor.  The vulnerability 
index (ENVFACTORS) is the average of the three environmental factors, with 
vulnerability increasing in the index.   
Overall, the Southeastern states are the most vulnerable to manure nutrient 
contamination of water resources.  Mississippi, Georgia, and North Carolina were ranked 
as the most vulnerable, followed closely by Tennessee and South Carolina.  High scores 
in these states are attributed to high percolation and runoff scores, indicating high 
                                                 
37 Residual manure nutrients calculated assuming no export from the farm (from Kellogg, et al. (2000)). 
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vulnerability to nitrogen contamination.  Virginia, Kentucky, and North Carolina had the 
highest soil erosion scores, making them the most vulnerable to phosphorus 
contamination.  Among the lowest overall scores were Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, New 
Mexico, and Arizona.  High soil erosion scores in Montana, North Dakota, and Idaho 
differentiated these states from states with the lowest overall scores. 
 
4.2.4.2 Changes in Residual Nitrogen 
Residual nitrogen ratios were obtained from Kellogg, et al. (2000).  Kellogg, et al. 
measure county residual nitrogen as the ratio of recoverable manure nitrogen to the 
potential for cropland and pastureland to assimilate manure nitrogen.38  Individual county 
residual nitrogen ratios were converted to state residual nitrogen ratios by calculating a 
weighted average of all counties within a state.  Weighting was based on the counties 
proportion of total state cropland and pastureland.  The percent change in residual 
nitrogen (RESNCHANGE) was based on the difference between state residual nitrogen 
ratios in 1992 and 1997.  An increase in the percent change represents an increase in the 
potential for problems associated with manure nitrogen.  This does not account for 
additions to the stock of residual manure nitrogen for a particular year, nor does it 
account for potential accumulations in the stock due to residual nitrogen in previous 
years.  The RESNCHANGE variable provides a rough measure of the change in potential 
environmental damages associated with manure nitrogen, however, this variable does not 
                                                 
38 This residual manure nitrogen calculation assumed export from the farm and no export from the county.  Naturally, 
residual manure nitrogen is lower when export from the farm is assumed.  This measure does not account for export to 
adjacent counties, therefore distorting the results. 
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account for the location of potential manure nitrogen applications, whereas the 
ENVFACTORS variable described above is calculated spatially.    
Correlation between the ENVFACTORS variable described in the previous 
section and RESNCHANGE is 0.51.  Across all states, the average change in residual 
nitrogen between 1992 and 1997 was approximately an 11% increase.  States such as 
Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Missouri, and Georgia had the highest percent 
increases between 1992 and 1997.  Montana and Rhode Island experienced the largest 
percentage decreases in residual nitrogen over the same period.   
 
4.2.5 Environmental/Rural Development Preferences 
4.2.5.1 Democratic Support 
Durden, et al. (1991) examined the formation of US coal strip-mining legislation 
in the 1970’s.  The formation of legislation was analyzed in the framework of a trade-off 
between the environmental degradation due to coal strip-mining and the economic 
development resulting from coal strip-mining.  The authors proposed that congressional 
voting on a 1974 surface-mining control bill was dependent on the relative political 
power of environmental versus coal industry groups, the importance of coal mine 
employees in the local economy, political ideology, and political leadership preferences.  
Political leadership preferences were classified as either Democratic or Republican.  The 
Democratic Party was expected to demand stronger environmental regulations while the 
Republican Party demands weaker legislation.  Empirical results confirmed expectations; 
the Republican Party variable was strongly significant, having a negative impact on the 
tendency to vote for the more stringent coal strip-mining environmental legislation.   
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In an analysis of the public choice determinants of EPA penalties for carbon 
emission violations, Mixon (1995) proposed that states represented by Republican 
governors between 1988 and 1990 may have lobbied for less severe penalties.  The 
presidency of George Bush was thought to potentially increase the influence of the 
Republican governors, enabling them to lower the penalties for noncompliance within 
their respective states.  The empirical results found that the number of days a state is in 
violation of EPA carbon emission standards increased if a Republican governor 
represented the state.  Also, although insignificant, the likelihood of violating EPA 
emission standards increased if a Republican governor represented the state.  In general, 
Mixon found that interest groups do have an impact on the penalties assessed by the EPA.  
Mixon concluded that the EPA was influenced by the lobbying efforts of the businesses 
that it was mandated to regulate.       
The two studies mentioned above both highlighted the importance of political 
preferences in the determination of environmental policy.  Democratic voters were 
thought to demand stricter environmental legislation than their Republican counterparts.  
State voting tendency may provide an indication of the weight that states place on 
environmental quality versus economic development.  Thus, the percent of state voters 
that voted for the Democratic Party in the 1996 Presidential Election (DEMOCRAT) was 
used as a proxy for the environmental preferences of the state (US Census Bureau, 
1997).39  Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island showed the highest levels of 
Democratic support in 1996, whereas Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming showed the highest 
levels of Republican support.     
                                                 
39 A dummy variable (GOVERNOR) was also constructed, taking the value of 1 if the state had a Democratic governor 
in 1997 and 0 if the state had a Republican governor in 1997.  Among the states, Maine was the only to have an 
Independent governor and was assigned a zero since the previous governor was Republican. 
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 4.2.5.2 Percent Changes in Per Capita Income 
In the context of the G-H model, the weight the incumbent government places on 
aggregate social welfare is a measure of the willingness of the government to sell policies 
in return for campaign contributions (Damania, et al., 2003).  Fredriksson and Svensson 
(2003) argued that the weighting factor is a measure of the level of corruption in the 
political system.  In the G-H presentation, the incumbent government weights aggregate 
social welfare and campaign contributions in its objective function.  “Social welfare will 
be of concern to the incumbent government if voters are more likely to re-elect a 
government that has delivered a high standard of living” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 
p. 838).  In this analysis, the weight the government places on aggregate social welfare is 
a measure of the willingness to set policies that will favour rural economic development 
over environmental quality.  In relation to the G-H model, social welfare (environmental 
quality in this analysis) is more important to the incumbent government when the recent 
performance of the rural economy has been relatively good.  The following section 
argues that the recent performance of the rural economy represents the pressure on the 
incumbent government to pursue rural economic development initiatives.  Stated another 
way, the recent performance of the rural economy exogenously determines the preference 
for economic development relative to environmental quality as perceived by the 
incumbent government.   
An examination of the history of economic development policy in Wyoming by 
Gerking and Morgan (1998) provides an example of the importance of recent economic 
performance on the formation of environmental policy.  The review of economic 
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development policy in Wyoming notes that prior to escalations in energy prices the 
promotion of economic development was a political priority in the early 1970s.40  
However, during the energy boom years of the 1970s and 1980s economic development 
become less of a political priority.  High economic growth rates shifted the focus of 
public policy away from economic development and towards the protection of 
environmental quality.  Commenting from the perspective that high economic growth 
rates were costly to the existing residents of Wyoming, Gerking and Morgan (1998) state 
the following:  
Rapid growth fueled by the booming mineral industries often was viewed 
as a cause for concern and state policy makers during that period directed 
efforts largely at reducing economic growth rates and mitigating its 
adverse consequences.  Environmental standards were made more 
stringent and the Department of Environmental Quality was created.  
Processes were institutionalized to govern the location of new mines and 
processing plants when the Industrial Siting Commission was established 
(p. 137). 
   
When energy prices declined in the mid-1980s the focus of public policy on economic 
development was renewed.  In 1984 the Economic Development and Stabilization Board 
was created, and among other initiatives promoted the use of state funds for low-interest 
loans to manufacturers.   
As described by Gerking and Morgan, the history of economic development 
policy in Wyoming supports the concept that governments pursue economic development 
in times of low economic growth.  However, in periods of high economic growth the 
perceived political importance of economic development initiatives falls.  When 
Wyoming experienced high economic growth rates the public policy focus shifted from 
economic development to the protection of environmental quality.  As the economic 
                                                 
40 “Wyoming ranks first among US states in coal production, fifth in natural gas production, and sixth in oil 
production” (Gerking and Morgan, 1998, p. 134). 
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fortunes of Wyoming shifted, the public policy focus on economic development relative 
to environmental quality also shifted.        
Three common indicators of rates of economic growth are (i) changes in per 
capita personal income, (ii) changes in total employment, and (iii) changes in population.  
In this analysis, recent economic growth rates were measured by percent changes in rural 
per capita personal incomes.41  In a discussion of the political decision-making process 
regarding the tradeoff between economic growth and environmental quality, Harrison 
(1996) states the following:  
[The] electoral cycle is decidedly short term relative to the ultimate 
economic consequences of environmental degradation.  As a result, near-
term economic costs can be expected to loom larger than distant economic 
benefits in politicians’ eyes (p. 471).   
 
Since the electoral cycle is four years long and governments are generally 
perceived as short-term decision makers, the time span for the percent change in per 
capita income should range between two and four years.42  For the purposes of this 
analysis, three variables were constructed, one for each of two year, three year, and four 
year changes (%) in state non-metropolitan per capita personal income (PCIyear) based 
on statistics provided by the Bureau for Economic Analysis (BEA).  The change in state 
non-metropolitan per capita income over four years (PCIfour) was designated as the 
preferred proxy for the pressure for rural economic development.  This variable coincides 
with the length of the electoral cycle and is long enough to smooth out the impacts of the 
economic cycle.  Iowa, Rhode Island, and Minnesota had the highest increases in per 
                                                 
41 The percent change in total rural employment was also constructed and tested in place of the change in rural per 
capita income. 
42 In an update of Fair (1996), Fair uses the growth rate of real per capita GDP in the three quarters prior to the election 
(GROWTH) as well as the number of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in which the GDP growth 
rate was greater than 3.2% (GOODNEWS) to predict the incumbent share of the two-party US Presidential vote.  Both 
GROWTH and GOODNEWS are positive and significant, indicating that recent economic growth factors are important 
to incumbent US Presidential candidates.  Update retrieved June 15 from World Wide Web: 
http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/RAYFAIR/PDF/2002DHTM.HTM    
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capita income over four years, followed by Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Missouri.  
California, Idaho, and Montana had the lowest percent changes in per capita income over 
four years.   
 
4.2.6 Livestock Production Costs 
Instrumental variables for livestock inventory are the livestock production costs, 
including total state population (TOTPOP), corn prices (CP), agricultural land values 
(LANDVALUE), manufacturing wages (MFGWAGE), and agricultural real estate taxes 
(PROPTAX).  Higher total state population is expected to attract a higher livestock 
inventory because livestock producers benefit from being closer to market.  This is 
especially true for a dairy state like California.  Fluid milk is costly to transport so 
production will move towards the final market.  This is less the case in the poultry, pork, 
and beef industries, where other factors, such as the availability of grazing land for beef 
production may become more important.  Corn represents an important input into 
intensive livestock production.  Corn prices are expected to have a negative impact on 
intensive livestock inventories.  High land values are expected to have a negative impact 
on inventory.  Manufacturing wages are used as a proxy for the cost of labour in the 
intensive livestock industry.  Higher manufacturing wages are expected to decrease 
livestock inventory.  Property taxes (data available for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995) 
give an indication of the business climate; higher taxes are expected to decrease 
inventory.   
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max Min 
STRING 10.886 5.054 19 0 
NUTSTDS 0.591 0.497 1 0 
SETBACK 0.750 0.438 1 0 
RANKSTDS 1.023 0.731 2 0 
LOG(AU1997) 12.944 1.442 15.019 8.147 
PERCENTRURAL 32.143 20.401 70.065 1.504 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY 1539.536 1282.034 5260.54 41.226 
ENVFACTORS 4.295 1.798 7.667 1 
RESNCHANGE 11.785 40.506 172.768 -55.376 
NATAMENITY 3.731 0.988 6.259 2.172 
DEMOCRAT 47.039 6.571 61.5 33.3 
PCIfour 17.181 3.793 28.856 8.649 
LOG(TOTPOP) 15.063 1.025 17.283 13.097 
CP 3.07 0.294 3.66 2.527 
LANDVALUE 1041.371 926.881 4393.667 137.667 
MFGWAGE 13.683 1.449 18 10.790 
PROPTAX 0.835 0.693 4.12 0.087 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
4.3 Econometric Specifications 
In this section a number of alternative econometric models are proposed to 
examine the empirical validity of the theoretical model.  The econometric results of these 
specifications will be presented in the next chapter.  The preferred specification is 
presented first (section 4.3.1) accompanied by a discussion of the variations on the 
preferred specification.  Alternative specifications using the binary proxies for regulatory 
stringency are presented in section 4.3.2.  A brief outline of the econometric models 
tested in this thesis is presented in Appendix B.    
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4.3.1 Preferred Specification 
The preferred specification is presented below.  This specification will first be 
estimated using OLS.  Reduced form estimations of the two equations follow, allowing 
the validity of the instrumental variables to be examined.  Two-stage least squares 
(TSLS) estimations will be performed in order to account for the potential endogeneity 
between regulatory stringency and intensive livestock inventory.TP43 PT     
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The validity of the PCIfour variable is tested using PCIthree and PCItwo variables 
as substitutes for the pressure for rural development.  These two specifications are tested 
using TSLS.  The overidentifying restrictions are tested for all TSLS specifications.    
The preferred specification is run as a two-stage tobit (TSTOBIT) model due to 
the potential that the censored nature of the regulatory stringency variable has materially 
affected the results.  The TSTOBIT results are presented for the stringency equation only.  
Also, an alternative proxy for the marginal damages from intensive livestock production 
is tested: the RESNCHANGE variable is used in place of the ENVFACTORS variable 
due to the potential for measurement error in ENVFACTORS.     
 
                                                 
TP
43
PT Coefficients on endogenous variables are represented by iδ and coefficients on exogenous variables are represented 
by ijβ  in equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
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4.3.2 Alternative Specifications 
The final group of models tested in this analysis use a number of alternative 
discrete choice proxies for the regulatory stringency dependent variable.  The structural 
equations for each of these alternative specifications are estimated.  The first two models 
within this group use binary logit (to account for the discrete nature of the dependent 
variable) to estimate the stringency function.  In the first alternative specification, 
SETBACK is used as a proxy for the stringency of ILO environmental regulations.  The 
second specification uses NUTSTDS as the measure for regulatory stringency.  The third 
of the alternative specifications is an ordered logit analysis of RANKSTDS.  The 
specification of these three models is as follows.   
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter stated the general specification to be estimated in the empirical 
component of this research.  Two equations were specified; the first is the regulatory 
stringency equation as derived in the theoretical model and the second is the livestock 
inventory equation as has been estimated in previous empirical studies of the US 
livestock industry.  These models will be estimated as a system in order to account for 
potential endogeneity between regulatory stringency and livestock inventory.  The data 
requirements were discussed in detail, outlining the type of data that best represents the 
model and providing a summary of the characteristics of the actual data collected.  The 
chapter concludes with an explicit specification of the system of equations to be 
estimated.  Two groups of specifications are suggested: first, the preferred specification 
and second, the alternative specifications based on the alternative measures of regulatory 
stringency.   
 The following chapter will present the econometric results of the preferred and the 
alternative specifications.  Interpretation of the results will involve an analysis of the 
preferred specification as well as comparisons between the preferred model and the 
alternative specifications.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of the econometric analysis are presented in this chapter.  The results 
of the preferred model are presented first, followed by the alternative specifications for 
regulatory stringency.  Parameter estimates are presented in table format, accompanied 
by a discussion of the results and where appropriate a comparison of the results among 
different specifications.   
 
5.1 Preferred Specification 
We first present the results for the preferred group of models.  This section is 
divided into five subsections as follows.  OLS results for the regulatory stringency and 
intensive livestock inventory equations are presented first (section 5.1.1).  Second, the 
reduced form estimates are provided, allowing for examination of the validity of the 
instrumental variables (section 5.1.2).  The third subsection presents the results from the 
two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimations (section 5.1.3).  In the fourth subsection a 
two-stage analysis of the regulatory stringency equation using TOBIT in the second stage 
is performed (section 5.1.4).  The final subsection presents a TSLS estimation using the 
alternative proxy for marginal damages (section 5.1.5). 
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5.1.1 OLS Results   
5.1.1.1 Regulatory Stringency 
The OLS results for both equations, using PCIfour as the proxy for rural 
economic development pressure are presented in Table 5.1 below.  The stringency 
equation has an R2 of 0.499.  According to the theoretical model, expectations regarding 
the sign on LOG(AU1997) are ambiguous.  The highly significant positive sign in the 
OLS regression reveals that intensive livestock inventory has a positive impact on 
regulatory stringency.  Environmental regulation of the ILO industry therefore reacts to 
production levels, a result suggested by other studies (Park, et al. (2002) and Herath, et al. 
(2003)).  Given results from the theoretical model, a positive relationship between 
livestock inventory and stringency indicates that marginal damages are likely increasing 
in livestock inventory.  Additionally, since the measurement of livestock inventory is in 
animal units, this variable captures the relative quantity of manure nutrients produced 
across states.  The positive sign is consistent with the expectation that regulatory 
stringency increases as potential pollution damages increase.   
The PERCENTRURAL variable has a significant positive impact on regulatory 
stringency, consistent with the theoretical predictions.  The higher the percent of the 
population that is rural, and therefore the higher the proportion of the population that may 
be negatively affected by ILO pollution, the higher the regulatory stringency.  This 
indicates that the greater the potential disutility from ILO pollution, the more likely the 
government is to implement more stringent environmental regulations.  Contrary to 
expectations, the interaction term between PERCENTRURAL and DENSITY is 
negative.  Since the pollution from intensive livestock production is distributed spatially, 
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it is expected that high rural population densities in regions where rural citizens comprise 
a large portion of the population will increase the number of citizens who are potentially 
adversely affected by intensive livestock pollution.  The interaction term captures the 
spatial density of rural citizens, providing a proxy for the marginal damages of ILO 
production due to air quality concerns.  The negative sign on this interaction term 
indicates that air quality concerns may not be significant determinants of the stringency 
of ILO environmental regulations.   
 
Table 5.1: Regulatory Stringency OLS Results 
 Coefficient Elasticity t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: STRING     
INTERCEPT -14.84360 - -1.667761 0.1040 
LOG(AU1997) 1.316709 0.12095 3.644786 0.0008 
PERCENTRURAL 0.120495 0.355777 3.154935 0.0032 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.001469 -0.207744 -1.704172 0.0970 
ENVFACTORS 1.264742 0.499032 2.435497 0.0200 
NATAMENITY 1.247615 0.42759 1.630662 0.1117 
DEMOCRAT -0.213879 -0.924145 -1.807551 0.0790 
PCIfour 0.410194 0.647386 3.009108 0.0048 
499.02 =R      
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
As expected, ENVFACTORS is positively related to regulatory stringency.  The 
coefficient on ENVFACTORS is positive and statistically different from zero at the 2% 
level.  This variable controls for both residual nitrogen levels (dependent on cropping 
practices) and the environmental characteristics (climate, soil type, etc.) of a state.  
Combined with the animal units variable (AU1997), the positive sign on ENVFACTORS 
indicates that ILO environmental regulations are highly responsive to the potential for 
pollution from intensive livestock production.  Aggregate manure nutrients, the ability of 
the environment to assimilate those manure nutrients, and the vulnerability of watersheds 
to potential pollution have a positive impact on the stringency of regulations.   
States relatively abundant in natural amenities are expected to have more stringent 
ILO environmental regulations.  The econometric results find that NATAMENITY has a 
positive although statistically insignificant impact on the stringency of regulations.  Since 
the natural amenity scale is positively related to rural population change, this variable 
may also be capturing the impact of changing demographics on the stringency of 
environmental regulations.  For example, if rural population growth is due to the influx of 
retirees from metropolitan centers, then there is likely greater pressure for increased ILO 
environmental regulations.  Compared with existing rural residents who may benefit 
economically from the ILO industry, retirees from metropolitan centers likely have less 
interest in the economic health of the intensive livestock sector and lobby for more 
stringent regulations.44              
The percent of votes received by the Democratic presidential candidate in 1996 
was used as a proxy for the political preference of the state.45  Contrary to expectations, 
the DEMOCRAT variable had a negative impact on the stringency of regulations.  The 
                                                 
44 Two alternative proxies were tested in place of NATAMENITY.  First, five-year changes (1988-1993) in non-
metropolitan population (%) (POPCHANGEFIVE).  The correlation between POPCHANGEFIVE and 
NATAMENITY is 0.640.  The sign on POPCHANGEFIVE was positive but statistically insignificant.  Second, based 
on two components of the natural amenity index as provided by the ERS (1999), an alternative natural amenity index 
was constructed using the average temperature in January and the average number of days of winter sunlight 
(JANINDEX).  The correlation between JANINDEX and NATAMENITY is 0.471.  Consistent with expectations, the 
sign on JANINDEX was positive and statistically significant at least at 1%.   
45 Regional dummies (for the Southeast, Northeast, Midwest, and West) were constructed to account for different 
regional preferences for environmental regulation.  The South was found to have a positive impact on the stringency of 
regulations, while the Midwest and Northeast had negative impacts on regulatory stringency.  All results for the 
regional dummies were highly insignificant.   
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incorrect sign on this variable may be due to aggregation over the entire state.  If 
primarily rural forces drive ILO environmental policy, then the percent of the non-
metropolitan population that voted Democrat may be a better proxy for the state political 
preference for environmental protection.46     
The PCIfour variable had a positive and significant impact on the stringency of 
ILO regulations, conforming to a priori expectations regarding the pressure for rural 
economic development.47  States that are experiencing relatively higher per capita income 
growth rates implement relatively more stringent ILO environmental regulations.48  This 
result is statistically significant: the null hypothesis that PCIfour has no effect on the 
stringency of ILO environmental regulations is rejected at the 1% level.         
 
5.1.1.2 Livestock Inventory 
The overall fit of the livestock inventory equation is good, having an R2 of 0.737.  
The OLS results of the intensive livestock inventory equation are presented in Table 5.2 
below.  Livestock inventory is positive and significant in regulatory stringency, contrary 
                                                 
46 A dummy variable was constructed for the presence of a Democratic governor (GOVERNOR).  DEMOCRAT, 
GOVERNOR, and DEMOCRAT*GOVERNOR were run in the preferred specification.  DEMOCRAT and 
GOVERNOR had negative signs while the interaction term was positive.  Both GOVERNOR and 
DEMOCRAT*GOVERNOR were statistically insignificant at the 20% level.  Using GOVERNOR in place of 
DEMOCRAT in the preferred specification revealed a positive although highly statistically insignificant impact on 
STRING.      
47 The average (1995, 1996, 1997) non-metropolitan per capita personal income (RURALPCI) was used in place of 
PCIfour.  RURALPCI was positive but highly statistically insignificant.  Following the discussion of Shafik (1994) in 
the introduction to Chapter 1, the statistical insignificance of this variable may reflect the broad potential externalities 
from ILO production.  For example, agricultural pollution problems in the Gulf of Mexico extend beyond individual 
state boundaries, potentially weakening the relationship between state per capita incomes and state regulatory 
stringency.   
48 Due to the potential that government subsidies to the agricultural sector are driving the PCIfour results, an alternative 
proxy for the pressure for rural economic development was tested.  The change in non-metropolitan total employment 
(%) was calculated for each of four, three, and two year intervals (EMPyear).  The correlation between EMPfour and 
PCIfour is –0.161.  All three variables were highly insignificant in the preferred specification.  Consistent with 
expectations, the sign on EMPtwo and EMPthree was positive, while the sign on EMPfour was negative, contrary to 
expectations.  The correlation between EMPfour and NATAMENITY is 0.514.  When NATAMENITY was dropped 
from the regressions, the sign on all EMPyear variables was positive but highly statistically insignificant.  
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to expectations, although consistent with the results in Park, et al. (2002) and Herath, et 
al. (2003).49  Livestock inventory increases with the total population of a state, indicating 
that production tends to locate near to market, potentially due to cost efficiency in 
transportation and marketing.  Corn price is negative and statistically significant at the 
10% level.  As expected, land values have a negative impact on livestock inventory.  In 
previous studies, the relationship between land values and livestock inventory has been 
ambiguous.  Park, et al. find a positive and insignificant relationship between land value 
and livestock inventory.  Herath, et al. find a negative relationship between fed cattle 
inventories and land values, likely due to the lower value of rangeland, while the 
relationship between dairy cattle inventory and land values is positive.  Manufacturing 
wage and agricultural real estate taxes are both found to have a positive and insignificant 
impact on livestock inventories, contrary to expectations.50     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 This empirical analysis does not allow for an adjustment period between string and livestock inventory. It is therefore 
too soon to observe the response of livestock inventory to regulatory stringency. 
50 The positive sign on agricultural property taxes may indicate that the agricultural sector has shifted production from 
crops to ILO production in order to intensify their use of land.    
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Table 5.2: AU1997 OLS Results  
 Coefficient Elasticity t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: LOG(AU1997)     
INTERCEPT 2.971908 - 1.188013 0.2424 
STRING 0.084439 0.919233 3.110547 0.0036 
LOG(TOTPOP) 0.759300 0.7593 5.277860 0.0000 
CP -0.934615 -2.86913 -1.879179 0.0681 
LANDVALUE -0.000774 -0.80602 -6.375177 0.0000 
MFGWAGE 0.084408 1.15493 0.952515 0.3470 
PROPTAX 0.163653 0.136687 1.382108 0.1752 
737.02 =R      
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
5.1.2 Reduced Form Results 
Reduced form estimates of the stringency and livestock inventory equations are 
presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.  Both first stage regressions fit well, the RP2 P for the 
regulatory stringency and livestock inventory equations are 0.513 and 0.751 respectively 
and each specification is statistically significant at least at 1%.  As presented in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4, the instrumental variables for each endogenous variable are jointly 
significant in their respective reduced form equations at least at 1%.  
 
5.1.2.1 Regulatory Stringency  
Bound, et al. (1995) outline finite-sample bias in instrumental variable estimations 
when the relationship between instruments and endogenous explanatory variables is 
weak.  Stronger correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory 
variable leads to smaller bias of TSLS relative to OLS.  The F statistic for the joint 
significance of the instruments in the first stage endogenous explanatory variable 
estimation provides an indication of the strength of the correlation.  As shown in Table 
5.3 below, the instrumental variables for STRING, including PERCENTRURAL, 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY, ENVFACTORS, NATAMENITY, DEMOCRAT, AND 
PCIfour, are jointly statistically significant at least at 1%.  The F statistic for the joint 
significance of the instruments for STRING is 3.6597 and the inverse of the F statistic is 
0.2732, indicating that the finite-sample bias of STRING in the TSLS estimation of 
LOG(AU199) is relatively small compared to the bias due to OLS, although it may be 
quantitatively important.   
PERCENTRURAL and PCIfour are positive and statistically significant at least at 
5%.  ENVFACTORS is positive but looses statistical significance.  As in the OLS 
analysis of the structural equation for stringency, PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY and 
DEMOCRAT have negative signs, contrary to expectations.  Both variables are 
statistically insignificant at least at the 10% level.  In the reduced form estimation, 
NATAMENITY has a negative sign and its statistical significance has dropped 
significantly.   NATAMENITY may be correlated with LANDVALUE and 
LOG(TOTPOP) in the reduced form equation, causing the change in sign and the drop in 
the statistical significance of the NATAMENITY variable. 
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Table 5.3: STRING Reduced Form Results 
 Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: STRING 
INTERCEPT -3.953248 -0.181029 0.8575 
PERCENTRURAL 0.128782 2.052222 0.0484 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.001304 -1.172121 0.2498 
ENVFACTORS 0.463459 0.696380 0.4912 
NATAMENITY -0.415893 -0.255475 0.8000 
DEMOCRAT -0.263624 -1.581605 0.1236 
PCIfour 0.375642 2.597691 0.0141 
LOG(TOTPOP) 1.990353 2.479307 0.0186 
CP 0.920196 0.203311 0.8402 
LANDVALUE 1.29E-05 0.011877 0.9906 
MFGWAGE -1.053580 -2.833315 0.0079 
PROPTAX -0.224511 -0.276518 0.7839 
IV joint significance p = 0.007 F = 3.6597  
Equation significance p = 0.007   
513.02 =R  346.02 =R    
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The instrumental variables for livestock inventory have some interesting impacts 
on regulatory stringency in the reduced form equations.  LOG(TOTPOP) is expected to 
have a positive impact on livestock inventory, and a corresponding positive impact on 
stringency.  The reduced form results support this expectation.  The opposite is true for 
CP and LANDVALUE, for which the reduced form parameter estimates are insignificant.  
These two variables should have a negative impact on livestock inventory and a 
corresponding negative impact on regulatory stringency.  MFGWAGE and PROPTAX 
are expected to have a negative impact on livestock inventory and as a consequence, a 
negative impact on stringency.  MFGWAGE is negative and highly significant in the 
reduced form estimation of stringency, consistent with expectations.  Similarly, the 
relationship between PROPTAX and stringency is negative, although statistically 
insignificant.     
 
5.1.2.2 Intensive Livestock Inventory  
Table 5.4 presents the reduced form results for the intensive livestock inventory 
equation.  The instrumental variables for livestock inventory, including LOG(TOTPOP), 
CP, LANDVALUE, MFGWAGE, and PROPTAX, are jointly significant at least at 
0.01%.  The F statistic for joint significance of the instruments is 13.5735, providing an 
inverse of 0.0737, indicating that the finite-sample bias of TSLS compared to OLS is 
small and unlikely quantitatively important.   
LOG(TOTPOP) and LANDVALUE remain highly statistically significant in the 
reduced form estimation, both maintaining the correct sign as in the structural estimation.  
CP and MFGWAGE have negative, although statistically insignificant, impacts on 
livestock inventory.  The negative sign on MFGWAGE in the reduced form estimation 
conforms with a priori expectations.  The change in sign from that obtained in the 
structural estimation indicates that MFGWAGE is correlated with the instrumental 
variables for stringency.  As in the structural estimation, PROPTAX has a positive and 
insignificant impact on inventory.   
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Table 5.4: AU1997 Reduced Form 
 Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: LOG(AU1997) 
INTERCEPT -0.669532 -0.128874 0.8983 
PERCENTRURAL 0.019324 1.256602 0.2180 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY 4.10E-05 0.220750 0.8267 
ENVFACTORS -0.137334 -0.885080 0.3827 
NATAMENITY -0.314882 -1.140483 0.2625 
DEMOCRAT -0.045452 -1.645589 0.1096 
PCIfour 0.029466 0.688184 0.4963 
LOG(TOTPOP) 1.231879 5.013902 0.0000 
CP -0.442236 -0.540495 0.5926 
LANDVALUE -0.000485 -1.937280 0.0616 
MFGWAGE -0.030855 -0.289986 0.7737 
PROPTAX 0.067028 0.312711 0.7565 
IV joint significance p < 0.0001 F = 13.5735  
Equation significance p < 0.0001   
751.02 =R  665.02 =R    
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
As expected, ENVFACTORS and NATAMENITY have a negative relationship 
with livestock inventory.  The parameter estimate for DEMOCRAT is negative and 
weakly significant, indicating that intensive livestock inventory is negatively related to 
Democratic support.  PERCENTRURAL and PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY are both 
positive and insignificant.  Changes in livestock inventory due to changes in the percent 
of the population that is rural are unambiguously positive.  The direct effect of a change 
in PERCENTRURAL is positive, and the indirect effect of the interaction between 
PERCENTRURAL and DENSITY is positive.   
 
5.1.3 TSLS Results 
The structural equations were tested for the presence of endogeneity between 
regulatory stringency and livestock inventory.  Hausman tests (presented in Table 5.5 
below) as shown in Greene (2000) indicated that intensive livestock inventory is 
exogenous in regulatory stringency and regulatory stringency is exogenous in intensive 
livestock inventory.  Also, the residual correlation between the two structural equations 
was calculated at –0.2988.  This indicates that the residuals explaining regulatory 
stringency and livestock inventory are negatively related.  The negative relationship 
conforms with the expectation that increased regulatory stringency will decrease 
livestock inventory, but runs counter to the expectation that increased livestock inventory 
will necessitate an increase in regulatory stringency.  The negative relationship between 
the residuals may indicate that this specification is missing an explanatory variable for 
the impact of the increased costs due to regulatory stringency on livestock inventory.  For 
example, the level of enforcement of ILO environmental regulations may have a negative 
impact on intensive livestock inventories.  In this case, exclusion of the enforcement 
effort variable may partially explain the negative relationship between the residuals.   
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Table 5.5: Two-stage Least Squares Results 
 Coefficient Elasticity t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: STRING 
INTERCEPT -12.83992 - -1.077245 0.2885 
LOG(AU1997) 1.214429 0.111555 2.349113 0.0244 
PERCENTRURAL 0.119680 0.353371 3.029112 0.0045 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.001490 -0.210714 -1.720225 0.0940 
ENVFACTORS 1.276577 0.503702 2.456372 0.0190 
NATAMENITY 1.191891 0.408492 1.520027 0.1372 
DEMOCRAT -0.222456 -0.961205 -1.809676 0.0787 
PCIfour 0.406687 0.641851 2.942933 0.0057 
Hausman test: 
∧
)1997(AULOG  
 
 
p = 0.7841  
 
  
 Overidentifying restrictions: 
( )24χ = 5.305 (0.5 > p > 0.25) 
 
  
     
Dependent: LOG(AU1997)     
INTERCEPT 1.295577 - 0.421317 0.6760 
STRING 0.138323 1.50583 2.369854 0.0231 
LOG(TOTPOP) 0.708778 0.708778 4.999270 0.0000 
CP -0.724301 -2.22349 -1.458685 0.1531 
LANDVALUE -0.000706 -0.735208 -4.413930 0.0001 
MFGWAGE 0.165079 2.25873 1.303131 0.2006 
PROPTAX 0.200095 0.167125 1.019448 0.3146 
Hausman test: 
∧
STRING  
 
 
p = 0.2628    
 Overidentifying restrictions: 
( )25χ = 4.482 (0.5 > p > 0.25)    
Source: Author’s calculations  
As proposed by Hausman (1983), Greene (2000) outlines a procedure for testing 
the overidentifying restrictions based on the Lagrange multiplier principle.  Tests for 
overidentifying restrictions look for “evidence that there are exogenous variables in the 
model that have been inappropriately omitted from the equation being examined” 
(Greene, 2000, p. 700).  In other words, if the overidentifying restrictions are rejected this 
implies that one of the exogenous variables included in the system but presently not 
included in the equation being examined, should in fact be included in the equation under 
examination.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is performed as follows.  The residuals 
from the TSLS analysis of a single equation are regressed on all the predetermined 
variables in the system.   The R2 from this regression multiplied by the sample size is 
tested as a Chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying 
restrictions (Kennedy, 2003).  The LM test did not reject the overidentifying restrictions, 
supporting the validity of the instrumental variables in both specifications.  Results from 
the TSLS estimations are presented in Table 5.5.51   
Accounting for the endogeneity of intensive livestock inventory in the stringency 
equation reduces the coefficient on LOG(AU1997) from 1.317 to 1.214, representing an 
8 % decrease.  Comparisons of elasticity calculations indicate that the regulatory 
response to inventory decreases slightly, from 0.121 to 0.112 when the specification 
accounts for endogeneity.  Comparison of the elasticity estimates for livestock inventory 
indicate that the inventory response to regulatory stringency increases from 0.919 to 
1.506, representing a 64% increase.  Past estimates of the elasticity of livestock 
inventories with respect to stringency have ranged between –0.4 in the Roe, et al. (2002) 
                                                 
51 The Chi-square statistic for the LM test of the overidentifying restrictions are presented in Table 5.5.  The p-values 
for each of the Chi-square statistics are also presented.     
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study to 1.45 in the Park, et al. (2002) study.  The similarity between the Park, et al. 
elasticity estimates and those in this study is likely due to a couple factors.  First, both 
studies analyze the intensive livestock sector, including beef, dairy, hogs, and poultry.  
The Roe, et al. study focuses solely on the hog sector, finding a negative relationship 
between hog inventory and regulatory stringency.  Second, the method used to construct 
the regulatory stringency variable in this study is similar to the method used in the Park, 
et al. study.  
The coefficients on PERCENTRURAL and PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY are 
roughly equivalent in the OLS and TSLS estimations, although the statistical significance 
of both variables improve in the TSLS estimation.  The ENVFACTORS coefficient 
increases slightly from 1.265 to 1.277 when the TSLS model is estimated.  The 
coefficient on NATAMENITY decreases by approximately 4.5% in the TSLS estimation, 
accompanied by a decrease in the statistical significance of the estimates.  Elasticity 
estimates for ENVFACTORS and NATAMENITY follow the same patterns as the 
coefficient estimates.  The elasticity on DEMOCRAT increases in the TSLS estimation 
as do coefficient estimates and statistical significance.  The TSLS estimation reduces the 
significance of the PCIfour coefficient, the elasticity estimates, and the statistical 
significance.    
 The impact of LOG(TOTPOP) on livestock inventory decreases in the TSLS 
estimation.52  The coefficient on CP decreases and becomes less statistically significant.  
The corn price elasticity of livestock inventory declines by over 22% when TSLS is 
estimated.  The TSLS results for LANDVALUE are roughly equivalent to the OLS 
                                                 
52 The inclusion of LOG(TOTPOP) as an instrument for LOG(AU1997) is questionable.  Nonetheless, LOG(TOTPOP) 
does a good job of explaining LOG(AU1997) and the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected.  
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results.  The coefficient and elasticity estimates for MFGWAGE and PROPTAX both 
increase but remain statistically insignificant. 
The TSLS results reveal that the potential endogeneity between intensive 
livestock inventory and regulatory stringency has little impact on the determination of 
regulatory stringency, whereas endogeneity has a relatively large impact on the 
determination of intensive livestock inventory.  The Hausman test fails to reject 
exogeneity of intensive livestock inventory in the regulatory stringency equation.  This, 
coupled with small differences between the OLS and TSLS results, indicates that 
livestock inventory is a predetermined variable when regulatory stringency is formed.  
When the potential endogeneity of stringency was accounted for, the impact of regulatory 
stringency on intensive livestock inventory increased.  Livestock production responds 
positively to increased regulatory stringency, and when accounting for the impact of 
livestock inventory on regulatory stringency, the magnitude of the response increases.  As 
mentioned above, the positive relationship between regulatory stringency and intensive 
livestock inventory is unexpected, although not inconsistent with findings in previous 
studies.   
 
5.1.3.1 PCIthree and PCItwo 
The choice of the time span over which the change in per capita income is 
calculated is ad hoc.  As explained earlier, a four-year time span is chosen in order to 
reflect the impacts of the political cycle.  As a test of the validity the PCIfour variable, 
PCIthree and PCItwo are used in place of PCIfour.  If the results in these two alternative 
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specifications closely resemble those in the base model, one can conclude that the choice 
of time span is not driving the results.   
The results of the two alternative specifications are presented in Tables C.1 and 
C.2 in Appendix C.  LM tests reveal that the overidentifying restrictions are valid for both 
specifications.  The signs on the coefficients of all variables are consistent among the three 
specifications.  The elasticity of both LOG(AU1997) and PERCENTRURAL do not vary 
significantly across the three specifications.  PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY becomes 
more inelastic as the time span decreases from 4 to 2 years.  ENVFACTORS has a 
relatively constant elasticity across the different time spans considered.  The elasticity on 
NATAMENITY is lower in the model with PCIthree, where NATAMENITY is highly 
insignificant, having a p-value above 0.4.  The elasticity and statistical significance of 
DEMOCRAT both decrease when PCIthree and PCItwo replace PCIfour.   
The elasticity estimates for the change in per capita income variables range 
between 0.488 and 0.95.  Formulating theories regarding the relationship between the time 
span of changes in per capita income and the magnitude of the elasticity estimates is 
difficult.  One might speculate that the elasticity estimates would be greatest for the two-
year time span because the shorter time span is a better reflection of the current pressure 
for rural development.  Alternatively, the four-year time span may have a stronger impact 
on the pressure for rural development.  The four-year time span allows for the business 
cycle to smooth out, and corresponds with the political cycle.  Voters may see an 
economy’s four-year record as a better indication of the pressure for rural economic 
development.  The use of PCIthree and PCItwo do not significantly alter the results, and 
the statistical significance on both of these alternative proxies is similar to that obtained 
using PCIfour.   
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5.1.4 TSTOBIT Results 
The regulatory stringency measure is a summation of affirmative answers to a set 
of yes/no questions regarding the regulations imposed in a state.  This variable is 
therefore restricted to non-negative values.  A dependent variable is censored when 
values in a certain range are transformed to a single value.  In this case, all potentially 
negative values have been transformed to zero.  Since the dependent variable has been 
censored, this model is run using TOBIT.  Of the 44 observations of regulatory 
stringency, three are zero and the remainder are less than or equal to eighteen.  TOBIT 
analysis is typically performed in cases where zero values make up a significant fraction 
of total observations (Greene, 2000).  In this analysis, 6.8% of the observations are zero 
values.  While 6.8% is not a significant fraction, the stringency equation is run as a 
TOBIT in order to determine the impact of the zero values on the results. 
 Table 5.6 presents the second stage results of the TOBIT model (hereafter 
referred to as TSTOBIT), obtaining fitted values for LOG(AU1997) from the first stage 
regression of LOG(AU1997) on all exogenous variables in the system.  All signs in the 
TSTOBIT model are consistent with the signs in the TSLS model.  With the exception of 
the DEMOCRAT variable, elasticity and marginal effect estimates increase when the 
TSTOBIT model is used.  Most significantly, the elasticity of NATAMENITY increases 
by over 18% to 0.485.  Overall, there is little difference between the TSTOBIT and the 
TSLS regulatory stringency estimation results, indicating that the censored nature of the 
dependent variable is not a significant concern. 
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Table 5.6: TSLS TOBIT 
 Coefficient z-Statistic p-value Marginal Effects Elasticity 
Dependent: STRING      
INTERCEPT -17.58633 -1.420823 0.1554 -17.53233 - 
FITTED[LOG(AU1997)] 1.432957 2.580130 0.0099 1.428558 0.131225 
PERCENTRURAL 0.131156 2.977402 0.0029 0.130753 0.386065 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.001622 -1.562865 0.1181 -0.00162 -0.2291 
ENVFACTORS 1.334896 2.273129 0.0230 1.330797 0.525095 
NATAMENITY 1.419642 1.862657 0.0625 1.415283 0.485054 
DEMOCRAT -0.219558 -1.729620 0.0837 -0.218884 -0.945771 
PCIfour 0.428694 3.177641 0.0015 0.427378 0.674506 
448.02 =R       
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
5.1.5 RESNCHANGE Results 
The following section provides an alternative proxy for the marginal damages of 
intensive livestock production.  The validity of the ENVFACTORS variable is 
questionable as its accuracy relies on the map reading abilities of the researcher.  As an 
alternative, the percentage change in residual manure nitrogen between 1992 and 1997, 
designated RESNCHANGE, is substituted for ENVFACTORS.  RESNCHANGE 
provides a measure of the amount of manure nitrogen produced in the state, adjusted by 
the ability of the cropland and pastureland within that state to assimilate the manure 
nitrogen.  Holding all else constant, if this ratio increases over time, then regulatory 
stringency would be expected to increase.  Table 5.7 presents the TSLS results where 
RESNCHANGE is substituted for ENVFACTORS.  The significance of the 
NATAMENITY variable drops below the 30% level and as a result is dropped from the 
final estimation.   
The results in Table 5.7 are consistent with the estimation using ENVFACTORS.  
The response of regulatory stringency to RESNCHANGE is inelastic, estimated at 0.019.  
This may be the result of the potential feedback between the two variables.  Increased 
RESNCHANGE may increase stringency, but increases in expected stringency may 
decrease RESNCHANGE.  If the relationship is in fact simultaneous, and since the 
potential endogeneity has not been accounted for, then this elasticity estimate is biased.  
In addition to low elasticity estimates, the significance of the RESNCHANGE coefficient 
is low when compared to ENVFACTORS and NATAMENITY.  The elasticity on 
PERCENTRURAL decreases in this specification and the elasticity estimates of all other 
variables are roughly equivalent between the two specifications.  The LM test rejects the 
overidentifying restrictions at least at the ten percent level, indicating that the stringency 
equation is misspecified when RESNCHANGE is used. 
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Table 5.7: TSLS Results (RESNCHANGE)  
 Coefficient Elasticity t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: STRING     
INTERCEPT -2.300705 - -0.203117 0.8402 
LOG(AU1997) 1.148626 0.105511 1.977631 0.0555 
PERCENTRURAL 0.060677 0.179157 1.904748 0.0646 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.000718 -0.101539 -1.092032 0.2819 
RESNCHANGE 0.017370 0.018804 1.198398 0.2384 
DEMOCRAT -0.210867 -0.911131 -1.647069 0.1080 
PCIfour 0.418355 0.660266 2.904970 0.0062 
 Overidentifying restrictions: 
( )24χ = 9.2478 (0.1 > p > 0.05) 
 
  
     
Dependent: LOG(AU1997)     
INTERCEPT 1.008960 - 0.320266 0.7506 
STRING 0.147537 1.60614 2.427458 0.0202 
LOG(TOTPOP) 0.700140 0.70014 4.844919 0.0000 
CP -0.688342 -2.11311 -1.357900 0.1827 
LANDVALUE -0.000695 -0.723753 -4.252206 0.0001 
MFGWAGE 0.178872 2.44746 1.373831 0.1778 
PROPTAX 0.206326 0.172329 1.034190 0.3078 
    Overidentifying restrictions:  
( )25χ = 2.2368 (0.75 > p > 0.5)    
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
5.2 Alternative Specifications 
 This section presents the results using a number of alternative measurements of 
regulatory stringency.  In addition to providing verification of the original regulatory 
stringency variable, these alternative specifications should provide unique insights into 
the relationships being examined.  These alternative measurements are derived from 
individual questions that were part of the set of initial questions used for the regulatory 
stringency proxy.   
The first question deals with the legislation of setback distances.  States that 
impose setback requirements are assumed to be more stringently regulating the ILO 
industry.  SETBACK is a binary variable requiring the use of a logit model.  The second 
question deals with the presence of legislation that requires nutrient management plans.  
This question provides an indication of the pressure on the industry to adhere to sound 
agronomic manure application procedures.  Once again, a logit model is used for this 
specification.  The third question also deals with nutrient standards.  In this case, 
however, states are ranked according to the following three criteria: no nutrient 
management plan (NMP), a nitrogen based NMP, and a combined phosphorus and 
nitrogen NMP.  A state with a NMP based on both nitrogen and phosphorus is assumed 
to have more stringent regulations.  Since this variable is both discrete and ordered, an 
ordered logit model is used.   
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5.2.1 SETBACK Results 
The results for the SETBACK model are presented in Table 5.8.  The marginal 
effects and their associated statistics are reported in the last three columns of Table 5.8.TP53 PT  
All signs follow those in the OLS analysis.  The statistical significance of 
LOG(AU1997), ENVFACTORS, and PCIfour is maintained in this specification while 
DEMOCRAT looses significance.   
 
Table 5.8: SETBACK Logit Results 
 Coefficient z-Statistic Marginal Effects z-Statistic p-value
Dependent: SETBACK      
INTERCEPT -39.08931 -2.062643 -6.662556 -2.204 0.0275 
LOG(AU1997) 0.905582 1.755681 0.154351 1.729 0.0837 
PERCENTRURAL 0.100994 2.182216 0.172 2.2 0.0278 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.000233 -0.469364 -0.398 -0.427 0.6697 
ENVFACTORS 2.558268 1.942374 0.436043 3.19 0.0014 
NATAMENITY 3.010179 2.001080 0.513068 2.54 0.0111 
DEMOCRAT -0.146467 -1.272422 -0.25 -1.399 0.1618 
PCIfour 0.606887 2.215315 0.10344 2.234 0.0255 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Setback regulations would be expected to prevail in states where the air quality of 
rural residents is a high priority.  The importance of air quality would likely be captured 
                                                 
TP
53
PT The logit estimation is a non-linear functional form.  This implies that the coefficient estimates derived from logit 
estimations do not represent the marginal effects as they do in OLS.  The marginal effects of an explanatory variable on 
the dependent variable are a function of the coefficient estimates from a logit regression.  The logit marginal effects 
expression for the partial derivative of the probability of y =1 with respect to ix is: ( ) 21 −+ βββ XXi ee  (Kennedy, 
2003).  The marginal effects are calculated at the means of the explanatory variables.   
primarily by the PERCENTRURAL, PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY and the 
NATAMENITY variables.  The first two variables represent the potential for spatial 
competition between rural residents and ILO production.  PERCENTRURAL is 
statistically significant in this estimation, while the significance of the interaction term 
falls well below the 50% level.  The insignificant and incorrect sign on the interaction 
term indicates that rural population density has a statistically insignificant negative 
impact on the imposition of setback legislation.  The NATAMENITY variable captures 
the opportunity cost associated with reduced air quality.  A region that is well endowed 
with natural amenities has an incentive to ensure that ILO operations do not damage the 
air quality associated with their natural amenities.  NATAMENITY is statistically 
significant at least at 2%, an improvement over the OLS results where NATAMENITY 
was insignificant at least at 10%.    
 
5.2.2 NUTSTDS Results 
The presence of setback regulations was used as a proxy for the effort to maintain 
the air quality of rural citizens.  The effort to maintain water quality is measured by the 
presence of nutrient standard regulations.  Table 5.9 presents the logit results for the 
NUTSTDS specification.  As in the SETBACK model, the signs in the NUTSTDS model 
are consistent with the OLS analysis using STRING as the dependent variable.   
Since the effort to regulate nutrient standards are interpreted as the effort to 
protect water quality, ENVFACTORS and LOG(AU1997) should be two of the primary 
determinants of NUTSTDS.  Among the independent variables, only LOG(AU1997), 
ENVFACTORS, and PCIfour are significant at the ten percent level.  The marginal effect 
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of ENVFACTORS is insignificant at least at the 10% level.  After controlling for 
livestock inventory and the aggregate production of manure with LOG(AU1997), regions 
that are most vulnerable to manure nutrients would be expected to be more likely to 
impose nutrient standards.  The sign on the ENVFACTORS coefficient is positive, and 
statistically different from zero, while the marginal effects are positive and insignificant.  
This inconsistency detracts from interpretations of the results, however the 
ENVFACTORS variable is marginally significant and has the expected positive impact 
on the imposition of nutrient standards.   
 
Table 5.9: NUTSTDS Logit Results 
 Coefficient z-Statistic Marginal Effects z-Statistic p-value
Dependent: NUTSTDS      
INTERCEPT -23.08842 -2.133965 -2.43466 -1.95 0.0512 
LOG(AU1997) 0.997344 2.327185 0.105169 2.297 0.0216 
PERCENTRURAL 0.064490 1.526369 0.0068 1.57 0.1165 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.000517 -1.109470 -0.000055 -0.98 0.3268 
ENVFACTORS 0.617974 2.040987 0.0652 1.424 0.1545 
NATAMENITY 0.876020 1.511932 0.0924 1.245 0.2132 
DEMOCRAT -0.046731 -0.614758 -0.00493 -0.552 0.5811 
PCIfour 0.417396 1.968328 0.044 2.255 0.0241 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
The coefficient on LOG(AU1997) reveals that livestock inventory has a greater 
influence on the likelihood of imposing nutrient standard legislation than it has on 
setback legislation.  However, evaluation of the marginal effects indicates that changes in 
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livestock inventory have a greater impact on the probability of imposing setback 
legislation than on the probability of imposing nutrient standard legislation.  This result 
indicates that regions are overall more responsive to the concerns addressed by setback 
legislation than they are to the concerns addresses by nutrient management legislation.  In 
regions where nutrient management is a primary concern, the marginal effect of changes 
in livestock inventory should have a greater impact on the probability of imposing 
nutrient management legislation.  On the other hand, in regions where the air quality of 
rural citizens is of primary concern, the marginal effect of livestock inventory on setback 
legislation would be expected to be higher than the marginal effect of inventory on 
nutrient management legislation.  The marginal effect of PCIfour is relatively greater for 
the imposition of setback legislation compared to nutrient standard legislation.  As in the 
case of livestock inventory, this result may be driven by the reality that more states have 
implemented setback legislation than have implemented nutrient standards.     
 
5.2.3 RANKSTDS Results 
The previous specification did not differentiate between the imposition of 
nitrogen standards and the imposition of combined nitrogen and phosphorus standards.  
Combined phosphorus and nitrogen standards are assumed to be more stringent than 
nitrogen standards alone because the addition of the phosphorus standard increases the 
requirements the ILO producer must satisfy.54  In addition to ranking the stringency of 
nutrient standard legislation from 0 through 2, the ordered logit analysis breaks 
environmental factors into two categories.  First, the percolation and runoff factors are 
                                                 
54  This assumption does not hold if one of the standards is irrelevant.  Despite this significant shortcoming, the results 
of the RANKSTDS model are presented in order to assess the impact of different environmental factors on the 
implementation of phosphorus and nitrogen standards.  
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grouped and referred to as NFACTOR.  Second, the soil erosion factor is referred to as 
PFACTOR.  This allows for an analysis of the stringency of nutrient standard legislation 
in terms of the responsiveness to nitrogen and phosphorus vulnerability separately.  Table 
5.10 presents the results of the ordered logit model.   
The PERCENTRURAL, PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY, and NATAMENITY 
variables are statistically insignificant at least at 70 percent.55  Of primary interest in this 
specification are the coefficients on the NFACTOR and PFACTOR variables.  
NFACTOR is expected to have an impact on both the probability of imposing nitrogen 
standards (Y=1) and the probability of imposing the combined standards (Y=2).  
PFACTOR is expected to have a positive impact on the probability of imposing both 
nitrogen and phosphorus standards.  The NFACTOR variable is insignificant at least at 
the 10% level while the PFACTOR variable is significant at the 10% level.  Changes in 
the NFACTOR have a negative impact on the probability of either imposing no standard 
or imposing a nitrogen standard alone.  The probability of imposing both nitrogen and 
phosphorus standards increases as the potential for nitrogen contamination of water 
increases.  Phosphorus has the opposite effect on the probability of imposing the different 
nutrient standards.  Contrary to expectations, as the potential for water contamination by 
manure phosphorus increases, the probability of imposing a phosphorus nutrient standard 
decreases.  These results indicate that the potential for manure nitrogen contamination of 
water has the greatest impact on the probability of imposing more stringent nutrient 
standards, including phosphorus standards.   
 
                                                 
55 Dropping these variables from the regression does not significantly alter the results so they are retained in this 
specification in order to maintain consistency with the other results. 
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Table 5.10: RANKSTDS Ordered Logit Results  
 Coefficient z-Statistic p-value Marginal Effects 
Dependent: RANKSTDS    Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
LOG(AU1997) 0.555548 2.139723 0.0324 -0.0929 -0.0028 0.0957 
PERCENTRURAL -0.002755 -0.120697 0.9039 0.0005 0 -0.0005 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -6.00E-05 -0.158772 0.8738 0 0 0 
NFACTOR 0.299243 1.406084 0.1597 -0.0501 -0.0015 0.0515 
PFACTOR -0.492210 -1.830350 0.0672 0.0823 0.0024 -0.0848 
NATAMENITY -0.154989 -0.351361 0.7253 0.0259 0.0008 -0.0267 
DEMOCRAT -0.067718 -1.108334 0.2677 0.0113 0.0003 -0.0117 
PCIFOUR 0.163944 1.638449 0.1013 -0.0274 -0.0008 0.0282 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
While not significant at conventional levels, the PCIfour variable is positive and 
significant at least at 11%.  Increases in PCIfour have a negative impact on the 
probability of imposing no standards and the probability of imposing nitrogen standards 
alone (the marginal effect on Y=1 is quite low).  The effect of PCIfour on the probability 
of imposing both nitrogen and phosphorus standards is positive.  Consistent with a priori 
expectations, this indicates that states with higher per capita income growth over the 
previous four years are more likely to impose more stringent nutrient standard 
regulations.     
 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
 The econometric results presented in this chapter have provided strong empirical 
support of the theoretical model of environmental policy formation in the US intensive 
 115
livestock sector.  Specification of the stringency equation largely conformed to the 
predictions as outlined by the theoretical model.  The livestock inventory equation 
provided results consistent with other empirical studies of the US intensive livestock 
sector.   
 The econometric model provided conflicting results regarding the pressure for 
rural economic development.  The DEMOCRAT variable has a negative impact on the 
stringency of regulations, indicating that states where Democratic support is high are 
more likely to have less stringent regulations.  This is inconsistent with the common 
perception that Democratic supporters are more supportive of environmental protection 
initiatives.  A possible explanation of these unexpected results is that the variable 
captures the support for Democrats across the entire state, while rural Democratic support 
would be a better indication of the pressure for rural economic development.56    The 
pressure for rural economic development is also measured by the percent change in per 
capita income.  PCIfour had a positive impact on the stringency of regulations in all 
specifications considered.  These results indicate that state governments implement more 
stringent ILO environmental regulations when the rural economy is relatively prosperous 
and implement weaker environmental regulations when the rural economy is performing 
relatively poorly.  These results provide some evidence that the recent performance of the 
rural economy, as measured by changes in per capita incomes, has an impact on the 
stringency of environmental regulations imposed on the intensive livestock industry.    
 The other propositions derived from the theoretical model are generally supported 
by the econometric results.  As the percent of the total population that is rural increases 
                                                 
56 Democratic support may be capturing the influence of urban voters who are not concerned with the stringency of 
intensive livestock environmental regulations.  The dummy variable representing Democratic governors had the 
expected positive sign, but was statistically insignificant.     
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the stringency of ILO environmental regulations increases.  The sign on the interaction 
term between the percent of the state population that is rural and the rural population 
density is contrary to expectations.  If the interaction term, 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY provides a measure of the proportion of the state 
population that has environmental concerns, the sign is expected to be positive.  The 
econometric results indicate that this interaction term has a negative impact on the 
stringency of regulations.  This may indicate that the interaction term is capturing some 
of the influence of rural citizens that benefit from the intensive livestock sector.  A higher 
proportion of rural citizens in states that have high rural population density may benefit 
from intensive livestock production.  For example, if the prosperity of a certain rural 
economy is tied to a healthy dairy industry, then rural citizens are more likely to oppose 
the implementation of more stringent ILO environmental regulations.  The interaction 
between rural population density and the proportion of the state population that is rural 
may be capturing the importance of the intensive livestock sector to the rural economy.  
The impact of the potential for pollution damages from ILO production is positive as was 
predicted by the theoretical model.  This result indicates that environmental regulations 
are partly motivated by the public interest in response to the potential for environmental 
degradation.   
 Alternative specifications of the regulatory stringency variable supported the 
results of the base measure for regulatory stringency.  These alternative specifications 
focused on the protection of air and water quality.  The results in the setback legislation 
specification were consistent with the results for the base measure of regulatory 
stringency.  All independent variables, with the exception of the interaction term and 
DEMOCRAT, were significant at least at 10%.  Among the statistically significant 
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variables, all signs conformed with a priori expectations.  Results for the nutrient 
standard legislation specification were not as strong.  All signs in this specification were 
consistent with those in the base specification, but the statistical significance of the 
variables declined.  LOG(AU1997) and PCIfour remained strongly significant and 
ENVFACTORS was marginally significant.  The final specification ranked states 
according to the stringency of their nutrient standard legislation.  The results from this 
specification deviate from the preferred specification results.  The signs on 
NATAMENITY and PERCENTRURAL change and the significance of all variables 
except LOG(AU1997) and PCIfour falls dramatically.  This specification provides some 
insight into the impact of vulnerability to nitrogen and phosphorus water contamination 
on the stringency of environmental regulations.  As of 1997, these results indicate that 
nitrogen has a greater impact on the implementation of more stringent nutrient standard 
legislation.   
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CHAPTER SIX: 
SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This chapter will provide a summary of the major conclusions that this research 
has drawn regarding the hypothesis and the objectives set out in Chapter 1.  In addition to 
concluding remarks, this chapter will present some of the limitations of this study and 
discuss potential areas for further research.      
 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis addressed the tradeoff between environmental quality and rural 
economic development, controlling for factors such as the power of environmental 
groups, the potential environmental damages from ILO production, and the size of the 
ILO industry.  A further objective of this study was to examine the potential endogeneity 
between regulatory stringency and intensive livestock inventory.   
 A review of the political economy literature pertaining to trade and environmental 
policy examined the general role of special interest group lobbying in the formation of 
public policy.  Essentially, this literature focuses on the specification of the government’s 
objective function.  According to the model developed by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), incumbent governments are concerned strictly with improving their chance at 
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reelection.  As a result, their objective function is comprised of campaign contributions 
from special interests and the aggregate welfare of society, both of which improve their 
chances at re-election.  The weight an incumbent government places on aggregate social 
welfare determines the rate that the government is willing to trade aggregate social 
welfare for campaign contributions.   
The G-H model has provided the foundation for recent literature dealing with the 
political economy of environmental policy (Fredriksson, (1997), Aidt (1998), and 
Schleich (1999)).  This literature is based on models that specify government objectives 
functions in the same manner as G-H.  Empirical applications of these models use 
measures of government corruption for the weight the government places on aggregate 
social welfare relative to campaign contributions (Damania, et al. (2003), Fredriksson, et 
al. (2003), and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003)).  An early empirical application to 
agriculture examined the endogenous relationship between regulatory stringency and 
government transfers to the polluting industry (Eliste and Fredriksson, 2000).  
The literature dealing with the US intensive livestock sector has focused on the 
relationship between intensive livestock inventory and the stringency of ILO 
environmental regulations.  These studies examine the impact of state-level regulations 
on the spatial location of intensive livestock production.  Among these studies, Metcalfe 
(2001) and Park, et al. (2002) account for the potential endogeneity between livestock 
inventory and regulatory stringency.  Metcalfe proposes instrumental variables for 
regulatory stringency, but does not provide a theoretical foundation for the determination 
of regulatory stringency in the US intensive livestock sector. 
The theoretical framework developed in this thesis was based on the model 
presented by Fredriksson (1997).  The theoretical model solved a two-stage game 
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between the ILO sector lobby and the incumbent government.  The weight the 
government places on aggregate social welfare relative to the profitability of the ILO 
sector is dependent on the pressure the government is under to stimulate rural economic 
development.  This reflects the political tradeoff between rural economic growth and 
environmental quality as perceived by the incumbent government.   
A number of predictions emerged from the theoretical model.  Of central 
importance to this thesis, the model predicted that the weight the government places on 
aggregate social welfare relative to ILO sector profitability has a positive impact on the 
stringency of environmental regulations.  The model further predicted that the pollution 
damages and the marginal disutility from pollution (representing the power of 
environmental groups) have a positive relationship with regulatory stringency.   
The empirical analysis examined the determination of US state-level intensive 
livestock environmental regulations as they stood in 1997.  An index measuring 1997 
regulatory stringency was constructed based on the ACPNTF survey; similar indices 
based on the ACPNTF survey have been used in a number of studies of the US intensive 
livestock industry (Metcalfe (2001), Park, et al. (2002), Roe, et al. (2003), and Hepath, et 
al. (2003),).  In order to substantiate the results derived from the preferred measure of 
regulatory stringency, a number of alternative measures of regulatory stringency were 
constructed based on individual questions as selected from the ACPNTF survey.  In 
addition to the regulatory stringency equation, the empirical analysis component of this 
thesis specified an equation explaining intensive livestock inventory.  Aggregate 
intensive livestock inventory was measured based on AU equivalents as developed by the 
USDA (Kellogg, et al., 2000).   
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The pressure for rural economic development was measured based on percent 
changes in rural per capita income over four years.  This variable was interpreted as 
follows; incumbent governments in states with higher percent changes in four-year per 
capita incomes are under less pressure to pursue rural economic development initiatives.  
According to the theoretical model, this implies that governments in states with relatively 
high percent changes rural per capita income place a greater weight on aggregate social 
welfare and as a result implement more stringent intensive livestock environmental 
regulations.    
In addition to the percent change in rural per capita income, a measure of the 
percent of the population that voted for the democratic presidential candidate in the 1996 
election served as a measure of the political preference for rural economic development 
versus environmental quality.  Democratic voters are generally perceived as having 
greater concern for protecting the environment.  Therefore, a state that voted for the 
democratic presidential candidate was expected to have a stronger preference for 
maintaining environmental quality and as a result more stringent intensive livestock 
environmental regulations. 
The null hypothesis presented in Section 1.3 states that the pressure for rural 
economic development has no effect on the stringency of US intensive livestock 
environmental regulations.  Measured as the percent change in rural per capita income, 
the econometric results obtained in this study rejected the null hypothesis.  Additionally, 
this measure of the pressure for rural economic development had a positive relationship 
with the stringency of environmental regulations.  These findings are consistent with 
Prediction 1 of the theoretical framework, lending support to the theoretical model 
developed for this thesis.   
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The variable representing state preference for the Democrat party had the wrong 
sign in all specifications.  These unexpected results may have resulted from aggregation 
over the entire state, whereas the percent of the state rural population that voted for the 
democratic candidate would have provided a better measure of the rural preference for 
environmental quality.  The statistical significance of the democrat variable was generally 
lower than the statistical significance obtained for the four-year percent change in rural 
per capita incomes.  
In addition to the impact of rural development pressure on regulatory stringency, 
the empirical component of this thesis examined the role of the size of the ILO industry, 
the pollution damages from intensive livestock production, and the disutility resulting 
from intensive livestock pollution.  Endogeneity tests indicated that the relationship 
between intensive livestock inventory and regulatory stringency is potentially 
endogenous.  TSLS was used in order to account for the endogenous relationship between 
these two variables.  Instrumental variables for intensive livestock inventory included the 
log of total state population, state corn prices, state agricultural land values, average state 
manufacturing wages, and state property taxes on agricultural land. 
The econometric analysis found that the size of the intensive livestock sector 
within a state had a positive impact on the stringency of regulations.  Since aggregate 
livestock inventory was calculated based on AU equivalents, this variable measured the 
potential for manure nutrients to exceed the assimilative capacity of the environment, and 
therefore measured the potential for damages from intensive livestock production.  The 
positive and statistically significant sign on the AU1997 variable indicated that the size of 
the ILO industry and the potential damages from ILO production both had positive 
impacts on regulatory stringency.   
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The econometric analysis controlled for the disutility from intensive livestock 
pollution.  Three variables served as proxies for the disutility from pollution: (i) the 
percent of the total population that is rural, (ii) an interaction term between the 
aforementioned variable and the rural population density, and (iii) natural amenity 
endowments.  According to Prediction 2 of the theoretical framework, these variables 
were expected to have a positive relationship with regulatory stringency.  The percent of 
the population that is rural had the expected positive sign and was statistically significant 
in a number of specifications.  The interaction term, however, had a negative sign in all 
specifications and was generally statistically significant.  The natural amenity variable 
measured the attractiveness of each state as a retirement or vacation destination.  High 
natural amenity scores were correlated with high opportunity costs associated with 
expansion of the intensive livestock sector.  The natural amenity scores were therefore 
expected to have a positive relationship with regulatory stringency.  The natural amenity 
index generally had the expected sign and was statistically significant in a number of 
specifications.   
The econometric model further controlled for the impact of potential pollution 
damages due to intensive livestock production on regulatory stringency.  Environmental 
factors provided a measure of state vulnerability to water contamination due to manure 
nutrients.  This variable had the expected positive sign in all specifications and was 
generally statistically significant.  An alternative measure of the pollution damages from 
ILO production was based on changes in the residual levels of manure nitrogen produced 
in a state between 1992 and 1997.  This variable had the expected sign but was 
statistically insignificant.   
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Alternative proxies for regulatory stringency were constructed based on 
individual questions from the ACPNTF survey.  The three variables constructed provided 
measures of regulatory stringency based on setback standards and the stringency of 
NMPs.  The results of these specifications generally confirmed the results of the preferred 
regulatory stringency specifications.  The ordered logit analysis of nutrient standard 
legislation found that the potential for water contamination by manure nitrogen was the 
driving force behind the implementation of legislation dealing with NMP regulations.  
 
6.2 Study Limitations  
The primary limitations of this study are associated with the validity of the proxy 
variables used in the econometric analysis and the possible misspecification of the 
intensive livestock inventory equation.  In terms of proxy variables, the variables used to 
measure regulatory stringency, pollution damages, and the pressure for rural economic 
development are the most questionable.  Possible misspecification of the intensive 
livestock inventory equation is potentially troublesome regarding the use of intensive 
livestock inventory instrumental variables in the stringency equation. 
Regarding regulatory stringency, the variable constructed for this empirical 
analysis treated all types of regulations as having an equal impact on the compliance 
costs of intensive livestock producers.  As a result, two states with a different mix of 
regulations but an equal number of regulations will have identical scores.  In reality, 
different types of regulations will impose different compliance costs on the producers.  
As constructed in this analysis, the regulatory stringency variable does not distinguish 
between the compliance costs associated with different types of regulations.  
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 In addition to problems in measurement, the regulatory stringency variable 
simply captures the written stringency of regulations, whereas enforcement of the 
regulations may provide a more accurate measure of compliance costs due to 
environmental regulations.  Nonetheless, despite the measurement error in regulatory 
stringency, the variable constructed for this analysis is the best of available alternatives 
and has been used in a number of previous published studies regarding the US intensive 
livestock industry (Metcalfe (2001), Roe, et al. (2002), and Park, et al. (2002)).  
 The environmental factors and natural amenity indices are aggregated over the 
entire state, therefore limiting their accuracy.  The potential for pollution damages from 
intensive livestock production are highly site specific.  Local variations in topography, 
soil texture, and proximity to water resources all have an impact on the potential for 
damage from intensive livestock production.  The measures of environmental factors and 
natural amenity endowments used in the econometric specifications do not provide the 
detail required for an accurate analysis of the potential for water pollution.   
The validity of the proxy for the pressure for rural economic development used in 
this thesis is tenuous, thereby limiting the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the study.  In addition to the questionable validity of the percent change in four-year 
per capita income, the unexpected sign on the democrat variable casts doubt on the 
results regarding the political preferences for rural economic development.   
The second limitation of this thesis deals with specification of the intensive 
livestock inventory equation.  The specification used in this econometric analysis was 
based on specifications used in previous studies (Metcalfe (2001), Roe, et al. (2002), 
Park, et al. (2002), and Hepath, et al. (2003)).  Together, the results of these studies 
revealed an ambiguous relationship between intensive livestock inventory and regulatory 
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stringency.  Since this study required instrumental variables for intensive livestock 
inventory, the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between intensive livestock 
inventory and regulatory stringency detracts from the results derived in this research.  
Unique among previous studies, Roe, et al. (2002) found a negative relationship between 
county-level hog inventories and state regulatory stringency.  With the exception of the 
regulatory stringency variable, the Roe, et al. analysis was conducted at the county level, 
thereby allowing for the control of agglomeration economies.  The specification used in 
this analysis does not control for agglomeration economies and as a result potentially 
biases the set of instrumental variables used for intensive livestock inventory.   
 
6.3 Future Research   
 The study of environmental policy in the context of regional economic 
development has a number of potential areas suitable for future research.  Empirical 
studies of the G-H trade model have examined the level of trade protection across 
industries as provided by the US federal government.  A similar study examining 
differential enforcement of US federal environmental policy across industries would be 
interesting.  Perhaps an index of regulatory stringency across industries could be 
constructed based on the compliance costs as a percent of total value added in each 
industry.  A previous study examined the impact of corruption and state environmental 
policy on FDI (Fredriksson, et al., 2003).  This analysis could be modified, allowing for 
an examination of the impact of political pressures for economic development on the 
determination of environmental policy and as a consequence on state FDI.        
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 Further research into the nature of the political tradeoff between economic 
development and environmental quality is a potential area for further research.  This 
study used the percent change in per capita income over four years as the primary proxy 
for rural development pressure.  As described in the previous section, the validity of this 
proxy is questionable.  Further research investigating the determinants of the strength of 
the pressure for rural economic development would be useful.   
The empirical analysis performed in this thesis did not explicitly examine the 
impact of lobbying efforts on the stringency of environmental regulations.  Accounting 
for the strength of the ILO sector lobby would improve interpretation of the results.  The 
share of livestock in total agricultural production would give an indication of the strength 
of the ILO sector lobby.  A predetermined measure of this variable, such as the percent of 
agricultural receipts due to livestock production in 1980, would measure the 
establishment of an ILO sector lobby that is not endogenously determined with current 
environmental stringency.  Further analysis could examine the impact of other economic 
interests on the stringency of intensive livestock environmental regulations.   
   
6.4 Conclusions   
 The primary objective of this thesis was to examine the impact of the perceived 
short-run political tradeoff between environmental quality and economic development in 
the context of the US intensive livestock industry.  The theoretical model presented in 
this thesis proposed that the pressure for rural economic development has a negative 
relationship with the stringency of environmental regulations in the intensive livestock 
industry.  The econometric model tested this relationship based on different levels of 
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regulatory stringency and on changes in rural per capita incomes among states.  The null 
hypothesis stated that pressure for rural economic development has no effect on the 
stringency of regulations.  The econometric analysis performed in this thesis rejected the 
null hypothesis, finding that the percent change in rural per capita income had a 
statistically significant positive impact on the stringency of US intensive livestock 
environmental regulations.  Therefore, the primary conclusion from this research is as 
follows: an incumbent state government that is under greater pressure to pursue rural 
economic development initiatives will implement less stringent environmental 
regulations on the intensive livestock industry.  Whereas the EKC literature focuses on 
the long-run relationship between environmental quality and income levels, this study 
examined the short-run impact of political forces on the determination of environmental 
regulations.       
Secondary conclusions from this research deal with the impacts of the size of the 
intensive livestock sector, the marginal disutility from pollution, and the potential 
pollution damages from intensive livestock production on the stringency of regulations.  
The econometric analysis found evidence that the relationship between intensive 
livestock inventory and environmental regulations is potentially endogenous.  The 
econometric tests found that intensive livestock inventory has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the stringency of regulations.  The results concerning the marginal 
disutility from pollution were ambiguous.  The percent of the population that is rural had 
an expected positive impact on regulatory stringency, while the interaction term between 
the percent of the population that is rural and the rural population density had a negative 
impact on the stringency of regulations.  As expected, controls for the potential pollution 
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damages of intensive livestock production had positive impacts on the stringency of 
environmental regulations.   
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APPENDIX A 
1998 National Survey of Animal Confinement Policies: Selected Questions 
7. Are minimum setback distances required by state government for site approval? 
Describe any required setbacks.  
 
8. Are any physical or geological tests required? (e.g. floodplain restrictions, soil borings, 
compaction requirements) Describe.  
 
9. Are public notices or hearings required by state government prior to site approval? 
Describe any requirements and legal priorities or limitations.  
 
10. Does manure management, confinement facility construction, or facility operation 
require approval or a permit by any government entity in your state? Which level? 
Describe activities requiring approval by state agencies.  
 
11. Are regulatory staff required to make site visits before state government approval is 
given? If "yes", please describe.  
 
12. Must manure faculty design plans be provided and/or other criteria for manure 
management structures be met before state government approval is given. If "yes", please 
describe.  
 
13. Is a waste management plan required by state government before approval is given? 
If "yes", please describe information required in the plan.  
 
14. Does your state government assess any fees during the approval process for manure 
management, confined livestock facility construction, facility operation, or site location? 
If "yes", please describe.  
 
15. Does your state government impose nutrient standards or other limits which restrict 
amounts of manure applications, timing of land application, set backs for application, 
irrigation, or other forms of manure disposal from confined livestock operations? If 
"yes", please describe. 
 
16. Does your state government impose any bonding or financial assurance requirements 
to pay the costs for clean up of any spills or to pay for closure of abandoned facilities, 
etc.? If "yes", please describe.  
 
17. Are odor standards, such as number of objectionable days per year, etc., imposed as a 
matter of state government policy or court decisions in your state? If "yes", please 
describe the standards.  
 
18. Does your state government impose any requirements for controlling flies or other 
insects related to manure management or confined livestock operations? If "yes", please 
describe.  
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19. Does your state government require any ground water monitoring wells or systems? If 
"yes", please describe.  
 
20. Does your state government regulate any legal surface discharges from manure 
management systems of confined livestock operations? If "yes", please describe.  
 
21. Does your state government impose any penalties for illegal discharges into streams 
or waterways from manure management systems of confined livestock operations? If 
"yes", please describe.  
 
22. Does your state government impose any limits for consumptive water use that apply 
to confined livestock operations? If "yes", please describe.  
 
23. Does your state government impose any dead animal disposal requirements for 
confined livestock operations? If "yes", please describe.  
 
24. Does your state government impose any animal welfare requirements on confined 
livestock operations? If "yes", please describe.  
 
25. Does your state government impose any education or training requirements for 
manure application operators, manure handlers, or confined livestock operation 
managers? If "yes", please describe.  
 
27. Does your state government prohibit corporations or other entities from owning 
farmland or engaging in confined livestock operations? Please explain.  
 
28. Does your state government impose restrictions on packers owning or contracting 
livestock supplies? Please describe.  
 
29. Does your state government require packers to publicly report contract prices for 
livestock? Please explain.  
 
30. Does your state government prohibit or limit packers from providing price premiums 
or long term minimum price contracts for large suppliers of livestock? Please explain.  
 
31. Does your state government have any laws or policies which either encourage or limit 
innovative business arrangements for purposes of confined livestock operations (such as 
marketing alliances, closed cooperatives, and network entities)? Please describe.  
 
32. Have any statewide or local moratoria on confined livestock operations been enacted 
in your state? Please describe.  
 
33. Does your state government exempt confined livestock operations and/or land 
applications of manure from local zoning authority? Please explain.  
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34. Does your state government authorize local option referendums on confinement 
issues and/or impose any preemptions on local authority for regulating confined livestock 
operations? Please explain.  
 
35. Does your state government provide nuisance suit protection for some or all confined 
livestock operations under specific or general state statutes, such as "right to farm" 
legislation? Please describe.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Preferred specification: 
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Section 5.1.1: OLS results presented. 
Section 5.1.2: Reduced form estimations presented.  Validity of instrumental variables 
tested 
Section 5.1.3: TSLS estimated due to the potential endogeneity between STRING  and 
)1997(AULOG .  Overidentifying restrictions tested. 
Section 5.1.4: TSTOBIT estimated due to the potential that STRING  is a censored 
variable and this has materially affected the results. 
Section 5.1.5: RESNCHANGE  is substituted in place of ENVFACTORS in the TSLS 
estimation (section 5.1.3) due to the potential that ENVFACTORS has 
been improperly constructed. 
 
Alternative specifications: 
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Section 5.2.1: SETBACK  is used in place of STRING . Logit model accounts for binary 
dependent variable. 
Section 5.2.2: NUTSTDS  is used in place of STRING . Logit model accounts for binary 
dependent variable. 
Section 5.2.3: RANKSTDS is used in place of STRING . Ordered logit model accounts 
for rank ordered dependent variable. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1: TSLS Results (PCIthree) 
 Coefficient Elasticity t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: STRING     
INTERCEPT -9.461117 - -0.707673 0.4837 
LOG(AU1997) 1.244812 0.114346 2.177172 0.0361 
PERCENTRURAL 0.113210 0.334267 2.750458 0.0093 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.001319 -0.186531 -1.656751 0.1063 
ENVFACTORS 1.193449 0.4709 2.376786 0.0229 
NATAMENITY 0.599120 0.205334 0.827893 0.4132 
DEMOCRAT -0.213535 -0.922659 -1.652442 0.1071 
PCIthree 0.423349 0.487599 2.036456 0.0491 
( )24χ = 6.6704 (p ≈  0.25)    
     
Dependent: LOG(AU1997)     
INTERCEPT 1.089727 - 0.348553 0.7294 
STRING 0.144940 1.57787 2.416535 0.0207 
LOG(TOTPOP) 0.702574 0.702574 4.890269 0.0000 
CP -0.698475 -2.14421 -1.386735 0.1738 
LANDVALUE -0.000698 -0.726877 -4.299764 0.0001 
MFGWAGE 0.174985 2.39427 1.355788 0.1834 
PROPTAX 0.204570 0.17086 1.030389 0.3095 
( )25χ  = 4.1793 (0.5 > p > 0.25)    
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table C.2: TSLS Results (PCItwo) 
 Coefficient Elasticity t-Statistic p-value 
Dependent: STRING     
INTERCEPT -15.51301 - -1.301098 0.2015 
LOG(AU1997) 1.165881 0.107096 2.409397 0.0212 
PERCENTRURAL 0.104444 0.308384 2.667742 0.0114 
PERCENTRURAL*DENSITY -0.000937 -0.132509 -1.274102 0.2108 
ENVFACTORS 1.226583 0.483976 2.569280 0.0145 
NATAMENITY 1.238835 0.424581 1.720983 0.0938 
DEMOCRAT -0.176163 -0.761179 -1.448406 0.1562 
PCItwo 0.824684 0.949842 3.016021 0.0047 
( )24χ  = 6.1947 (0.5 > p > 0.25)    
     
Dependent: LOG(AU1997)     
INTERCEPT 0.912776 - 0.303284 0.7634 
STRING 0.150628 1.63979 2.885487 0.0065 
LOG(TOTPOP) 0.697241 0.697241 4.902371 0.0000 
CP -0.676275 -2.07606 -1.367842 0.1796 
LANDVALUE -0.000691 -0.719587 -4.336351 0.0001 
MFGWAGE 0.183501 2.51079 1.504464 0.1410 
PROPTAX 0.208417 0.174076 1.044910 0.3028 
( )25χ  = 3.9174 (0.5 > p > 0.25)    
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
